The Interpretation of Contracts Governing Corporate Debt Relationships by Bratton, William W.
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository 
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law 
1984 
The Interpretation of Contracts Governing Corporate Debt 
Relationships 
William W. Bratton 
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics Commons, Business Organizations Law 
Commons, Contracts Commons, Corporate Finance Commons, Economic Policy Commons, Economic 
Theory Commons, Law and Economics Commons, and the Work, Economy and Organizations Commons 
Repository Citation 
Bratton, William W., "The Interpretation of Contracts Governing Corporate Debt Relationships" (1984). 
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law. 878. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/878 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law by an authorized administrator of Penn Law: Legal 
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact PennlawIR@law.upenn.edu. 
THE INTERPRETATION OF CONTRACTS 
GOVERNING CORPORATE DEBT 
RELATIONSHIPS 
William W. Bratton , ]r. * 
INTRODUCTIO N 
There is a generall~ · accepted picture of corporate debt relation-
ships under \\·hich the entire responsibility for go\·ernance falls to the 
contract drafter. Contracts gO\·erning corporate debt instruments-
trust indentures in the case of bonds and debentures . and loan agree-
ments in the case of privately placed notes and long- term bank 
loans-are generally \·ie\ved as the only meaningful source of rights 
and d uties in corporate debtor-creditor relationships. ' State business 
corporation laws proYide no alternati\·e. as their creditor protection 
• Assoc iate P rofessor of La"·· Benja min N. Cardozo School of La\\·. Yes hiva Uni,·ersit\·: 
A.B .. 1913, J.D. , 1916, Colum bia Uni,·ersity . M\· coll eague, Davi d CarLson. pro,·idcd his usual 
able assista nce. Thanks aLso a re extend ed to John D. i'\ iles. fo r teaching me the d rafting basics . 
1 [A] fundamental characteristic of lo ng- term debt fin ancing is tha t th e rights of the 
holders o f the debt securit ies are largeh · a matter of con tract . There is :10 go1·erning 
bodv of statutory or co mm on la,,· that protects the holder of unsecured debt st•cu r-
ities against harmful acts lA th e debtor except in the most extreme sit11al ions . Sho rt 
of bankru ptcy. the debt secmityholder can do nothing to prokct himself a}.(ai nst 
actions oF the bornJ\I·er which jeopardize its ability to pa} the debt unlcs:; he takes a 
mortgage or other col lateral or es tablishes his r ights through cont ractual prmisions 
set fort h in the debt agreenll'nt or in dentu re . 
American Bar Foundat ion Corporate Debt Financing P roject. Co m mentar ies on i ndentmt•s :2 
(1911) (hereinaf ter cited as ABF Commen ta ries] , quoted in Broad\. Rocb,:t'l l1I>t 'l Corp. , 6.J:2 
F.2d ~):29. 940 n.JO (,Sth C ir.J(en bane). ccrt. den ied. 4.5·1 liS . D6.S (193 1) . 
l t should be noted th at a different picture obtains if a corpora te debtor becomes insoh·cnt. 
At that point, th e la"' of fra ud ulent co nw:yances rest r icts corporate management's di,;c retion to 
do business for the stockholders· benefit and im poses duties to creditors . See. e.g .. Unif. Fraudu-
lent Co nveyance Act§§ 4, 6, lA U.LA . :w.s. 240 (H)/ 8). 
\Vhile this Article discusses "debt contracts" th at go,·ern secured and unsecured borro"'ings, 
it doe,<; not discuss the la"· oF security interes ts an d mor tgages or th e interpretatio n of sccurit\· 
agreements or mortgage documents. 
A " trust indent ure" is a contract entered into bet'.veen a corporation issuing boncb or 
debentures and a trustee for the holders of the bonds or debent ures. I t deli neates the righ ts of the 
hold ers and the iss uer. Corporate pract ice d istinguishes "bonds" from "debent ures ... ·· Bo nds" are 
secured long-ter m notes issued pursuant to a trust indenture . "Debentures" are unsecured long-
term notes issued pursuant to a trust indenture. See ABF Commentaries . supra, at 7 n. 3 . A "loan 
agreement" is a cont ract entered into bet\l·een a corporation issui>1t; long-tern: notes and the 
purchasers of the notes . Like a t rust indentu re, it delineates th e ri ghts of the holders and the 
issuer. See id. a t c\ -1 4 . 
Loan agreements invoh -c the issuer and the holders in a direc t contra•:tual relationship. 
They tend therefore to govern transactions, like bank loans and insu ra nce cornpam· prinlte 
., ~~ 1 
0 11 
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pronswns are notorious!~ · ineffecti\-e. 2 Nor. traditionally . h<:l\ ·e judi-
cially imposed duties entered into the gowrnance of these relation-
ships .:) 
Com plica ted contract forms fill this gowrnance \·acuum. These 
form s ha, ·e been \\·or ked and re\\·orked by successi\ e generations of 
la\vyers to deal \\·ith th e rem otes t of contingencies rel at ing to the 
future course of the transaction and the borro\\·er·s business . The \ ·en· 
thoroughness of these contracts limits the role of courts in adjudicating 
contro\·ersies behYeen corporate borrmYers and long- term lenders. Tn 
the generally accepted picture. the judge ascertains and enforces the 
drafter's directions- a matter of "interpretation" ra ther than "]a,,-_ 
making' '-\\'ithout fu rth er im·oh·ement in the transaction. So con-
ceived , debt contract interpretation is a highly technical but cut-and-
dried exercise , lacking th e ethical element presented by gm·ernance 
disputes bet\\'een corporations and common stockholders. 
This Article tests the accuracy of the generally accepted picture 
against the evidence contained in some recent debt contract interpre-
tation cases. T he cases support a recomposition of the picture, with 
the interpreting judge put in the more prominent position of second-
ary lawmaker. But the picture emerging from the cases lacks focus: 
T he courts vacillate in famili ar ways, sometimes inclining to respect 
the drafter's primacy and the authority of words , and other tim es 
inclining to intervene in the relationship to effect a fair result . Indeed , 
the struggle for primacy between the exacting view of contract inter-
pretation of \Villiston and the first Restatement of Contracts4 (herein 
denoted "classical") and the more relaxed view of C orbin and the 
placements _ in••oh·i!l~ sma ll rlllmbe rs o!- lenders . Trust indenturl'S, !w co n tr<\s t. fa c- iliLrll· the 
borro.,,·ing of small am ounts of mone\· on ,! long-ll-rm basis From larger n umhc rs of l ~ nd,..:rs un 
identical term s h,- channc llinl( adm inistra ti (ln a nd e nforcement th rough u s inl(k• part,-_ the 
in dentme trustee: See \ ' _ Brudm·,- & \ l. Ch irelstcin. Co rporate F in ance S:2 (:2cl t•d . l !l7!l) . 
.\ccorc! in gh ·_ trust imit· ntures gnn~rn publich- iss ued honds and debentures . \ lode! forms of hnt h 
t..·pes of co n tract are rc-adih· '"·aila ble . For trust indentures . see ADF Commentari es . supra : 
Co m mittee o n De,·e!np rn en ts in Business Finan c ing of the Sect ion of C orporalinn . B,!nk inc an d 
Busin ess La .. , · of the _-\.nwr ic-an Bar Assnciat ion. 'dodcl Simplifit•d ! ndcntu r t' . :j.S Bus. Ll\\-_ --; --!l 
(19;:).3 ). For loan agreem ents _ St'L' :'-:assberg _ !.oar> Docmncn tati on: Basic Bu t Cn1':·lal. :3 (i Bm. 
LJ\\-. 8--!:3 (HlSl ): Simmon:;_ Drafting o f C omm e rci al Bank Loan Agreements _ 2S BHs. L"' 1 7~) 
(1972): S irnp~;on . Th t Drafting tlf Lu<.ln A:o::n:•e ntc~ nts: A BorrO\\·er 's \ ' i c'.\Tlu i nt . :28 Bus. La\\. 
1161 il')/:3 ) 
' See gcnna lh- B. \lan ning __ \ Conc ise Tc\th<Jok on Legal Cap ital S-' - ~!() (:2d l'd 1~)8 1 ) 
("statu tory !{·gai capital 1nachincry pn l\·idcs little c; r no significa nt pro t:.:c t ion ~o c-rt·d!tors of 
co rpor ations" ) . 
:l C f AB F Con1111 cntaries ~ supra note l. ~lt :2-:3 ( .. Th e- re is no ~o'- · ~·rn i ng body (_IF ::tatHtory o r 
conln lun la\v tha t protects the holder uf unst·cu red de bt St'cu rl tie~~ . 
Hestate m en t of Contracts ( 1 CJ:32 ) _ 
' 1 -
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Restatement (Second) of Contr acts5 (herein denoted "neoclassical") 6 
continues in the debt contract context. 7 
This Article concludes that courts should stop , ·acillating and 
take a fully neocl ass ica l a pproach to debt contract interpretation. The 
analysis that follO\\'S shm\·s that the arrogation of judicial goYernance 
authority entailed thereby \\'ill not impair corporate debtor-creditor 
relationships. 
I. STANDARD PRINCIPLES OF INTERPRETATION 
The first part of this Article recounts some basic principles of 
contract interpretation , both classical and neoclassical , and dem on-
strates that sc\·eral of these must be modified if the\· are to meet the 
speci al requirements of the debt contract context . 
A . Standards of Interpretation 
Contract in terp reta tion is the process by which courts ascert a in 
the meaning of unclear contract language. 8 Contract law pro\·icles 
norms to guide the process. 
In thei r classical formulation. these norms direct the court to 
adhere to t he text and look to standard English usage to supply 
r11eaning. ~, The\· em·ision an "obj ec tin·~ .. judicial inquiry: A correct 
' Hestatenwnt (Secrm d) o f Cont r uct:; ( l!lSl ) . 
,; The terms "cLssical .. and "neoclass icai" are P rofL"ssor \l acnc iL. See i\bc neil. C o ntrac ts : 
Adjustmt"nt of Lnn\.';·Tt: rt ll Ec,>nnmic P,ela t io ns Under Classical. :\enclassica l. ,mel Helation<Jl 
Contrac t La\\' . 7'2 :--.;,,. t .I.. He:'. :<S.t (197\),1 . 
' The struggle contintE'S in othl'r co nte;·: ts as w ell. Com pare In tcrfo rm Co . ,._ M itchell. :57.:5 
F.2d 1270 (9 th C ir. 197[)) (neocl ass ical approach to interpretatio n of sa les contr act) with 
Freem a n v. Contine nta l Ci nCo .. 3Sl F.'2d ..J59 (.S th Cir. 1967) (class ical approach to interprcta · 
tion of sales con tract). 
Th e contl ict bctw c'e n classica l a nd neoclassical approach es t•.J inte rpretatio n te-nds to he 
CLH<ce i,·cd histori cal!\·: T im e ma rc-hes on From the carh· modern era c.f \\'illiston to the co m plete 
m odern it\ of Corbin: cb s:; ici ,;rn is past and neoclas.1icism is p resen t. Th is historical p ic ture 
onrsimpiifico: m a ti'e rs consider ct bh·. hn\\l'\·er. Inter prd i< c c!dssi cism i,; full ;: disc red ited onh· in 
neoclass ical comm cntan· . Class ical approaches (if not the fu ll cl assica l program) li,·e on in th t 
same repor te rs and so n Jctin>cs the sa m e opin ions as the ir neoclassical counterparts. This Art icle 
exnn1ines the r;U1Jifica tiu n.•: of thi:; tense cocxi st ~~nce in resp ect of judicial interpreta tion o f debt 
contracts . 
5 See E. Farnsworth. Contracts§ 7 .7. at 477 (1982). This Art icle follows the distinction 
between vagueness and am biguitY !toted in \\'. Quine. \\'o;d a nc! Object 8.5 (1060). and 
amplified br Professor Farnswort h , supra, § 7.8 . a t -479-80 . Un cl e; th is distinction. ,,_·o rds :~re 
vague to the extent they de fin e il ·-distribution about a ccnt rai norn:" rather th a n a .. neatl.y 
bou!1ded clo.ss." A .. n1bi;{,u .i ty occurs \vhen a tcrin o r phr ase ls su.scept ible to t\\'0 or n1ore discrete 
readings. "Unclear" langu8gl-_· can b~ either "•:ague" or ··anl bi gu ous." Id. 
9 For a ~lassie classical opinion, see Eustis ?\-lin ing Co.\·. Beer. Sondheirn er ·~~Co., 239 F. 
976, 98-±-85 (S .D. i·~. #'1.. . 19} ~i) (L. I1and, J. } . Classic:at standards of in terpret ation are \\·ell 
exp lained in Farnswort:C, "\leaning" in the La\1· of Contracts . 76 Yale Lj. ~1:39, 9,\6- -i! (l967). 
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meanin.£ exists and can be d isco \ er ecl thro ugh proper an a h ·s is . T h at 
mean ing attaches \\ ·hether or not intended by the parties . Contrac tin.~ 
parti es . it is thought. should b e forced to express themsehcs in clear 
standard E nglish. 
I'~ eoc:las.' ical norm s. in contrast. direc t the cou rt w prc>tect the 
particula r p arties· expectations . T hey ab an don classical "objecti \·ity" 
in fcl\ or of l·esponsi \·eness to the par tic ul ar transaction a! context . Tlw 
parties· "subj ectin~ -- underst and ing of th e contract's m ea ning b eco mes 
a rele,·ant-- e\·en critical- contex tua l elcrnen t. 
Of co urse . opp osing part ies only r a rely ap pear in co urt con firm -
ing a commonly held subjecti, ·e meaning and lea\ ing the judge ,,· ith 
the minister ial job of attaching t heir m eaninQ to t he contract lan -
guage. \ lore com monly. th e .iudge must t ake a more acti\ ·e role in 
sh aping t he relationship. For example . if t \\ o parties h a\ e conflict ing 
uncl erstan clin~~s. the judge must choose bet \,een th em . A ·;imiia r 
choice m ust be m a d e \\ here on e p arty h as a suhjectin: understandinQ 
of a p rcA ision ·s mean ing and th e o ther part:· . ha,·ing neit h er read no r 
t hought about the p rm ision. h as no suhjectin· understa nclin ~~ <:lt a ll. 
The neoclassical Resta tenF·n t (Second ) in c] udes n or ms for tht · resolu -
tion of such cases. \ \'here subj ect ive unclc·r:-;t and inc;s con flict \\it h one 
anot}Jer or \':ith standard m ag£:". tlw Hcsta tL·nwnt !Second ) fin cls fa ult 
., \ · l' rh ·' f•c ,-J ·· ·· h· \\.;r· h -- l-,-· t'''· i ur) :Tl~-- ')f -· ,.~" ' ·l ' 'Jn ~ ,) 1· !1 (1'\ ... ' '1,. !· ]1' ' , , r)·lt 'l. ~ ... , ~ l . 1 r· <=\ 1 l ~ · . t _. . " l .~. J .•. "- ~ -~ ~- \_ 1 . .._ ~ __ , _ • • l _ K. . , • • '" ,_ .. .. . _ 
legal effec t. 
7.l .n. :.> '·-··,·t.<f._' \.•.·-.1-t t-.::ol;:_, ·, > ;~ -,·~ . . ~ ·,, i_·' -.> ' ): ·; ...... 1-\ - :-~·i::.: ·.· ('I !J ) ]· ~·:.r · j_ ~\ - f-'• 'l' ·J rl~- · r·-,: t· ·~n(1iq(f e.r' ·:l .l • ~ ' t ..__ t ... ,11 . • l lc . •. •. ,_) _ . •. _·~-t J '- '-l\..\. _ _ , , • ._ ~ ~-- 1 ··~ .:..:...~; 1:.~ 
prc)\ ·isit"Jn·s ;·r·l (~:·:_in i n.~~~ the n~.::oc1.a.-=.; .~ic~J _j~t cl_~~ ~ :rn ~.l~- pld~,· :::J.n ~·\· f~'n I11(Jr c 
IJrorn1n e:1t ro -~ e in f:hc· rcl :_l 7~ion :-~hip . If t h(~ }J.t'U'·. · i-~i o n i!.i \ "c)r>· u n c le;Jr~ the 
: l' G·~u ---· ·:-~r-.~~ , ... . ~ .-1 -- ~--lft c. ·r ..... c. lr-., .L .... f-:-.,~ -.~ · -i· ·:n .--i irrJ ! ( ~ ncr ~0 ~}-e ... . .... ,n tc·' ·r .cr-. , ·n1 'l j i. ·..:_""':' 1.:: r:\1-..• l.J '-lJ U!.t.. • . L .' ....... .l Ul 1::!..) 1_ l ...... ,) ~~~J. l. dl j, \.. . ~ ~ -..J'- t.l~ •-_:, L L .1 •_.\_,. .. _ \.. . \.._ , .L\.'• I l -
lates t:he r; ~ccs:')arv te r JTl. ~ 1 
•" l :~;('i_' ~if: . .; t·:_l::L' I:V='nt { ~·· l'Cond'l or CcJI:trac~s ~~ ~ :2\ ). :~Ul(~ l - 2:20; l '-\;,j }. Sl..'t~ :lLI) • Rcsicn··(·-
l/lf.'ili Sef'inui. C) rnltlt.'d Tt' : n 1s ~~nd Co~ 1 tr :~ct \1{~ thod. (i7 ~--~ o r n;__· l: L . Ht ·\ . ~-s .~s . ~ - q _-_:, .. :-)() I 1~1)'2~ 
{dcscrih in[1 t h ~.· · ·rcasor~ tn knO\': .. tc.'i t ln cht· Rt..':.; tat en1:..' T~t ( ::;~_· cu nd '!) . 
?'<ote th?. ~ t}~f:' ~·arty y~·i th ··r~·; a:~Gr! tt\ kno,,.--- i.e: a.t fdult hnth ir1 the ~ense nf bc i n~~ c;.Ilpa bl e ;_uJd 
in ti1e .)f.•D.:-J(· .:)f h ~:Y ing cat.lsec: the lt}';;:; . \:ult' aLso the .:fi i (·i c nc~· jL: dgn1ent irnpli r:i l in the ::1p-
~l Eut :;t' t.: l- :- 1 ,~ ::·t.·cen t ck·b~ c·ontr:-~c- t n : ) ir": icn~ . \. : o!·L":~:; 1 St ::71!::.-':- ·~ .:: Cn . -. - . A. :-ch c-r ~)~l.lli~_·ls 
\ li -...lh:~"tl .l (>-· :_)'"' U F . S:1pp. l.S:?.q :':3 .1) .>: .1.' . 1 ~}~ :3 } . ~ n \'.'h ich the fu il cJ\\·inl[ ;-eusc r; l ~ gi·-.- en f(n 
i ' (> _j t; ·;;~j () ! ~ ,;f ~: ~, i nte:~pr ::• i:~\t lnti : "l ;l pp~.·~_n_c; ·,:•cl tn ~hi: ti\" (_' •::.:j"J(-(•t (\t ir .l(; _-: or t>lt> h\_lnclhold -
r~ ::l cL: ~- s~llJj (·c ~_i•:e ':·l -:..·-; ~ -~ ·-~:"!.t ~r~~~_) \ '- - ~l ~:.t nres u .n~~:hi y ~iJf.! _ dd be :.t!1 
lDS-±] DEBT CO:\THACT .,~r: ,) I ._) 
1 o appl:-· ··subj ective" neoclassical interp retation principles to 
debt contracts successfulh·. one must be sensiti\·e to se\ era l contextual 
peculiari t ies. Consider first one species of debt contract. the trust 
indenture gm·erning publicly-tr aded bonds or d ebentures. T rust in-
dentures contain most l:- standardized p rm isions. \ \'ith the assistance 
of the Amer ican Bar Foundation's readily a\ ail a ble \1oclel Inden-
ture . i 2 considerable uniformity b as been achie\·t.xl among the standard 
provisions cont ained in trust indentures go\·erning different issues of 
bonds and debentures on th e market . Standardization benefits th e 
market by making the \ aluation process simpler and less costly. In 
\·aluincr an issue. the j)Hisncctin:· imTsto r ma\· assume th e 1nesence of 
0 • ' 
standard terms and focus excbJsh·ely on business points sucl1 as the 
soundness of the issu er, th e interes t ratt' . redemption ri ghb and the 
like . 1 i 
Now consider how the trust indenture's marketplace function 
bears on the judicial interpreta t ion p rocess . If a material variance 
were to open up between the st an d ard form ·s legal meanin g and 
investors· assumptions concerning its m eaning, market prices no 
lon ger wo uld reflect the value of bonds and debentures accurately. H A 
c bjt'cti'-c d C't ... ·i n-.inat iPn ha.secl i) rl the !~t r: _~uc.t~l.' ~ ppt•a rin~ in the ho ncl ag r{_' .:.~n l (:l l t .'" 1cl. ;;! t };).'35-
3C . T'hcn: fol1c· \•:s i ninH ·di ~tl'l y ~ i. :-:ccond . :-;uh_i cc: ti ,·t· reaso n fo r iTj :::ct inr~ tht.: sanu: i ntcrprL·t u-
tion ---- tht~ '" un >.:crtain ty an1 n n_1.! lFn-i d ( :~ l icL-;-_c;'' ~h <-lt til L :- ~_ ·t..tdi n_~ \\' (Jtdd pro rnp t . Id. :_t t LS:36 . 'l' hi ;.; 
:- cason ! n ~ is incnh ~·n:n t . Bundh~) l d ... -r ··qnccrtL.!i:tL<. and hnnd ;lnldL'r ··s!.l hjcct i\·c c \:pcct:.ttit"1 ns·· <.tf'_' 
t he san1c thi n~~: to p n .· \·ent unct .. TL: li i t .',· is t{ J p rot1.'Ct :_·.\pt:Ct:l t it nb . 
I·: The ?vfvd el IndcntlJ r t' is inc:u ;·lYJr c.tc'-::'1 ir: th t> :\BF Co n1n1t..:· ;·1taries . . \ Up!a r1ott.• l. Fo r fi!r tht: : 
d iscussion of the n1arket h.1nctic:n nf ~ h.:::' \lodel [n de n;:L:re . ;; ~t' Bratto n. Tf1e Ec:.J:1on1ic~ t1ncl 
Jurisprude:nc'=' of Con\·crtibl e Bends. l:, ;.~~ ~t \\. i.: . . L . l-\ f: \·. tfur th con·J in_g). 
13 A large de;~rce o F u;1i iorrn it~ · in th e L: n( 11; ' '~ ~ -· ,;f c!r~~::cnl ute indentu r ~'S i~ ess~·n tial to 
t he c ffec ti ~.-~ · fu ilC:tiuni :1.':.!. o ~- t!·:f..' ;"i nai :'.:iat rn<.l:~ ·~~ts·. \ tilit"r. ~ r:-ni t~: pf t;1t:: inden t i_i.rts tha t 
the issue (s uch ct.:.; the· ; :;t~ r ·~st !.":!f.,_· . tbt:- ;_n d.tJt;:ity d r-ih~ . Lh •.· rt'dernptio n a nd s i r.ki !1~ 
fu nd p nn·i.'li0:1s ;-t nd th .. : C(F;\ ~;i-.< ,·: H : r '-~- t~ · ,' ~LL.i ~ bt: ;_cc·r) f!O n;ic· c·oud iticns of d :t_· i:.;:-:llc ·.-_ 
\'·;i th o u t bein .~ :rli ~:Jed by P'-''_·; di~\r! ti c> .'·: in -~ LL' und:.:r1~. ;n :s in:; tr ~t !T: -:- ;:·;b . 
Brot:::td '- ·. Rock'-\·el ll nt 'l \...:urp . . L;--1: :2 .r" .-~ ~1 :-):=/L 9- ~:~ ;;)th C ~ r :·f•:-n b: liF.:.: . ·:.·:_· r t . dt>n it:tL -+5-! t_ : :-;. ~)f):) 
,l9Sl). 
1 ~ \\'here u.·-; p~ rtjcipJ.nL i.: t ~h, , i!! <-!rb.:· t c-an :_:t.~iL; ·-:t ~~:'-·ir ,~Hai r~ ;.tcc.·c·~din~.:!. to:_! 
u n!forrn i ~ib:.:rpr.r~ tat i (;·tt . '.'.-h;: th:.. t· if >:: c··:· :~ ~ <·t ~ 'r d : / ·1 .~ d i ; ;u ;.t~:;:ii c: ru pt ; ~ ~~jr;n . U1:. 
decreasr: the \·alu•_' cF ~d~ '-!(_~' b ,~ :~l\;:-·::· :: :i_; .;;; :: ~ :: d ::.~ ~"\..' ~ ttl~.- ir : tpai ·:· th':.· :: ff j ci~:nt \\· t:r~jng ;_il 
c~1 pit~l r:1arkcts . Su ch :_ln-~ · ;.::-t~iin~~c:: .·,· .u ic! \ : :!S~ [ -, · ~n (;:·~·i.:.-~ '.· t ht' ri;-.1-:..:_.; dCH_L tt:;_·rc>for ::..- , 
the a.dn1 i. n istr <:1~inn of :i!: :.:Ll c-~ ·. } ; ! ~ :~ :-:t.v:!I !it"lt\:· : · c :iir~ti:.·:: ·· . '.·u~. ~!d ~x- .._:r':.)~:.t cd !F i n :~: : rpr ... ·t :.l-
tion of hui lerpLltl' i' l(>-.. ·i:.:ln :·j:·. \'>·c:- c \\;~ .Jtc i t : ~ · d fli ji! Tit' :-; .-.:iit tn~ in c:\ l' ;· :,· jud iciu.l d is tr ic t 
i ~ the .~1at ·: on . 
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court could create such a \·ariance by interpreting a tr ust indenture in 
a \\·ay contra ry to its generally accepted marketpl ace meaning . Since 
judicial interpretation of one such stand ard form contract affects the 
meaning and effect of hundreds of oth er such contracts. an aberrant 
interpretation could create m arket-\\·idc uncertainty . Such uncer-
tainty would increase the costs of ,·aluing existing issues and drafting 
the lan guage of futur e issues . If a n aberrant interpretat ion gained 
general judicial currency, rights respecting all outstanding issues 
would be altered a nd market-\\ ide \\·ealth tr ansfers between b ond-
holders and stockholders w ould result. 
Thus, we find that the contract la\\ '" expectations"' of holders of 
publicly-traded debt securi ties and the assum ptions underlying the 
market pricing process amount to the sam e thing . For the neoclassical 
interpretation p rocess to protect these expections, the marketp lace's 
understanding of trust indenture terms mu st p re\ a il m ·er con flictin g 
judicial concepts in the rare case \\·here the marke tpl ace's underst an d-
ing confl icts \\"ith the meaning d ictated by standard En glish usage. 
\Vhether marketplace understand ing should also preYa il m·er 
conflicting understandings of parti cul ar issuers or t rustees presen ts a 
more difficult question . 1" The bondholders probabl:- · still han~ t he best 
of the argument . Consider the follm,·i ng h~-pothet ic al cast' : A bond 
issuer and the indenture tr ustee sccreth· agree as to tlwir ··subj ecti\ e"' 
understanding of the meaning of standard trust inden ture language 
w hile on not ice of facts suggesting that h,J nc! hol cle rs in the market-
place do not share their understanding . l\ot.e that here. th e "intent of 
the p ar ties" corresponds to th e secret lllCJ.n ing. A trust indenture is 
entered into hetl'>een thc issuer and th ·::o tr ustee for the bt·ndit of the 
bond or debenture holder::;: strict!:- speaking. the holde rs m-e not 
'"part ies .. to the cont ract. In thi s h\ poth:_·ti c<"lL then , an in terprstation 
l .. ll 1 .. . . ' . . . I • ,. • ' I ' J l ' t 1<tt to O\\"S t 1c mtcn t o± t11e partH.:s v:ow c! rnls"Cratc tnc ,)oncL10 Cl -
ers· confl icting e:m ectations a nd nenali ze tl1c'm for rt:h·im! on publici \ 
"-- .l ..l • . ' ... • 
·> ' · ·,;!'] "t]) 1 P i 11t'',),-li' '' ·t i 0 '1 '·l!1d th " l1"l ,·tr b ··t l.) rj r: in,'! l1J"I)C'·''"t; : 1' p' 1t ';;L' r·l' t: l. ~ l.-1, .L_ (. t ~ - \_ t ._J(.;,. ... l L I... ,_ - - , i ~ ·- '- •' • • _) !_ -.. • <.~ ._1 
- - -·-------·- ---
!s This issue aln1ost arose in John Har:coci: \IPt. L.ifc Ins . Co . . ,_ Caro: ina PcP.\·t:·; c~ Light 
Co .. I ll F.2d f:1G4 (2d Cir. 193:3) . 'The case . f1:rther ch sct~s:;ed infra no te 6S. concerned th e 
n1eani ng of the redemption provisions in t hl::' supp l t·r-r~er lta1 indenttJre govtTnin g an i~su e of 
p ri~\:ately placed util ity 1-.~onds . Each side pre~en tccl cnnfiict ing c':idence o f "industry understand-
ing." 7 1"7 F .2d a t 668 , 670 . 
1 ~ E\'en so . courts routinely st~tte that th e ··i ntent of th ~ pa ~· d es " is their guide in i nte ~·pr cting 
i:r ust indentu1es. See, e .g .. Broad v . Hock'.~: ell int' t Cc~ rp., fi-t~ F. ~d 929, 9 ~17 (.S th Ci!" .; (en bC\ nc). 
cert. denied, -!.5~ l~. S. 965 (1981 ) . But see Sharon St t.>el Corp.·;. Chase 1\ia ~h att a n Bankl l\ .A . ~ 
691 F.2d 1039, 1048 (:2cl Cir . 1982) (par ticu l ariz~~Ad i nt~·ntio:-:s cf pc.r:i es to st:.nc.l2.rd forrn tr•.1st 
ind:..'ntun:s found irn:lt...· \·an t) . ccrt. ch:niec: . iU:3 S. Ct. 12-S:·) i l ~jS :) L rJrnn d. t-i l ~~ F.:'2cl -~1 :-.; _ -L2~.J U)th 
C ir. JlJSll! r.p<ull_·l <1pi n ion in th t• sa: n•,· ca:;L· '" :ii J ~:'' ' i 
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results can be avoided by im·oking the ··reason to knm' ·· tes t aga inst 
the issuer, as it has ··reason to kno\\··· of the different understanding 
prevailing on the marketplace. 
The hypothetical becomes much more difficult if the issuer for-
mulates its understanding without collusion, secrecy, or notice of tell-
tale facts indicating a contrary understanding in the marketplace . Yet 
so long as " reason to know" is a concept sufficiently elastic to encom-
pass determinations that one party "should know" the meaning at-
tached by the other party, 17 then it provides a means of protecting 
marketplace expectations even here. The issuer arguably "should 
know" because it has an informational advantage . It can more effi-
ciently ascertain the market's understanding (by questioning its invest-
ment bankers or taking a survey) than marketplace investors can 
ascertain the subjective understandings of different bond issuers (by 
means of separate interrogations) . The issuer's fault ripens when it 
places the bonds in the stream of commerce without disclosing its 
subjective understanding. 
We have seen that the most basic of rubrics-intrepretation in 
accordance with the intention of the parties-cannot be applied liter-
ally in the interpretation of trust indentures . But hornbook standards 
of interpretation may be applied '-Vithout apparent need for adjust-
ment in the context of the other major species of debt contract, 
agreements governing bank loans and private placements . In those 
arrangements. borrowers an d lenders contract directly·; extensive 
face-to-face negotiations are likely to occur .18 Since the parties to the 
contract are the parties interested in the contract, interpreting in 
accord with the ·'i ntent of the parties" presents no problem . Even so , 
m:uketplace nnderstanding remains a potenti ally decisive, albeit sec-
ondary , source of meaning. Private loan agreements contain '"boiler-
pla te" provisions as well as heavily negotiated provisions . Such boiler-
plate may track or closeh· resemble the language of stan dard trust 
17 The Restaten1ent (Seco nd ) concept of "reason to knO\\ ... see1-ns to encornpass "should 
lmm •:." altho ugh i75 explanatory com ment is fa. r from dear. Hestatement (Seco nd) of Contracts§ 
19 comm ent b 11 98 1) : see also id. § 220 (2) (interpre tation in accord with ou tsid e usage prentil.s 
~}V CT the subjective uncie!'standing of a party ha\'ing reason to kno\v of tha t usage) . 
!o Tht: p ract ict• ii1 illsu ranCf.: cornpany p r i\·ate placctnents ha . .; each lendt>r l'nter i(1tn d 
.sepa rate nn te ,l ,~TC't tne nt \\·ith the issu t)r. But negotiati ons r11 ay be carried on be t\\' f.::~tn th e 
borrc~.\ ·(·r ~tnd a " lead" lende.1 acting inforn1ally on lx:hi:llf of other lnstitL:tion:-; in tht' -~~ roup of 
~ en ders. Ban k ar ran gen1ents also featu re larger institut ir;ns act in g as lt·ads. The relat inns bct\\TCn 
th e· p~rticip~_:tin g ba nks. ho\\'t' '.·f:'r. tend to b~ fo~·rnalizcd in pc:.rti cipa tion a.Qrc~..::nltnt.o.; . In ·· t rue' .. 
p~. :~1ciiJ~ltio ns. on l~- the lead bank c:ontnlcts v·:ith tht_· t::.t) lTO\\ ·er . It thcr c.•a :tc r sells pa1ticipabons 
in its io:::lns tr. othl'r bank.-:: under the participat ion ag!·c:.: rnent . ·· Agt·nted" particip at ions n1 nkc the 
lead hank the- agent of the oth c·rs in dealin g \\·ith dH.: horrO\\·cr and rn a:-· \·est rnorc or lt>ss contrnl 
of the udr:1inistratio:: nf the loan in the lead . See ~\assherg . :~up ru note .l . 2.t S.J9- 60 . 
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indentures . The particular parties , ·ery \\'e ll may h a \-e no subj ecti,·e 
understanding of the m eanin g of such provisions. Absent subjecti\·e 
understandin g, the understanding pre\ ailing in the relevant market-
olace-here the communit\· o f im·estment bankers , institutional in-
~ , . 
vestors and other leading institntions- \\'oulcl be the meaning most 
likely to protect justified expectations. 1 >~ Th e special place held by 
trade usage in the interpretation of commercia l contracts prm·ides a 
persuasive analogy. 20 
B. The 'B casonabh'ncss" Rubric 
The standards of interpretation discussed abon:: are more signifi-
cant in theory than in practice . Litigated quest ions of debt contract 
interpretation tend to concern either unnoticed drafting defects or 
unforeseen situa tions. Such cases result from failures of percepti on 
and prediction by those im·o l \'C:~ d in th e contractual relationsh ip. As a 
result , no one interested in the relationship has an articulable under-
standing of the contract's m eaning to put b efore the court . Accord-
ingly, courts often haw to in terpret debt contracts (and many othe rs 
as \\'ell) \vithout the aid of clarifying e \·idence of the parties' subjectiq:-
understanding or of outside usages. In such cases. the neoclassical 
interpreter_ like his classical cou nterp art. falls back on the rubri c 
"'reasonableness ... 21 
Reasonable interpretation rests on \\·hat co urts and la \\·ycrs as-
sume to be the lin~2:uist i c usaL':eS a nd other p c1tterns of mind of o rdinar-
ily reasonab le per:;ons . Courb and len\'\ e rs em ploy these assum ptions 
as inte rpreti \e ru les . 22 T he Hest atemen t (Second) contains the fa milia r 
cata logue . It assum es that reasonab le persons empl oy standard En-
glish US<'lg'.'· It thus includes t he rul e t hat la nguage be interpreted in 
accord \': ith its .. gene ral!) prt'\ ailing meaning ... :.: 1 It assum es that 
'" An e nti rch· diff<: rcnt lin e of reason ing ITia,· he: o ffen·d to sc;p por t the a rgument that the 
marketplace 's prcnti! in g unders ta nc! in .g ou g h t to he imposed. 
[One] ~~cono rnic fu nction [of th e ia"· of contracts] . . i.s to rL'Cl ucl· the complexit :: 
and h ence [tlw] cost of tr<r nsact JOns h\ supph·ing a set CJf nonnal krrm that. in tlw 
a bsc nct· of a Ia,,· of contracts. th e pa r ties ''ould ha 1·e l•l negot ia te e xp ressly. Th is 
function of t h e Ia'-' is s imi la r tn t hat perform ed b,· a st andard or torm contract. 
R . Posner. Econo m ic An ah·sis of Law 69 (2d eeL lq71). Tlms. b:·: choosing the interpretat ion th at 
most parties ccou ld choose. and all cl'.•:in g the minnri t\· to negot iate O tLt of such an in terpret ation . 
courts a re likely to reduce the cos t of negotiation-or so th e tht·on· goes . 
"" Sec U C. C . s·~ J.:W5. :2-208 (1978) . The gen er a l ized co ncept of a "asage .. as a ny "habitu ul 
or custom2 n pract ice" foun d in t he Hest.alL·m cnt (Second\ cou ld be applied tn mJ rket place 
understand ing of debt contract nwa ning . Hes ta kmcn t :Secon d) of C:on trJct:; § ~ :21 D. :2 :20 i J 981 1. 
~~ Sec E. Fa rns\;,·nrt h. supra noteS. * 7.9 . at -i9l. 
-- lei. § ·; ll. at .JCJ.'S 
" Hesta tcrnent iSc·cuncl ) of Co ntracts~ 2U :2(3 )(a) (lCJSl i. 
I 
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reasonable p ersons draft in tern a lly consistent d ocum ents. It thus in -
cludes th e rules tha t \\Titings in a single transaction b e interpreted 
together. and that an interpretatio n gi\ ing effective m eaning to all 
terms of an agreem ent p revail on:~ r a n in te r p ret a tion lea\ ing a part 
\Yitb an unreasonable or ineffec ti\·e meaning . 2·1 It assum es that even 
reasonable persons fa il to focu s their a ttention with equa l intensity o n 
all points in the transaction. It thus includes the rules th a t specific 
terms outweigh genera l t erms, exp ress terms outweigh courses of p er-
formance and trade usages. and separa tely negotiated terms outweigh 
standa rd ized terms. 2 ~ 
Both classicists and neoclassicists usc these rules. but t h ey justi fy 
them on different grou nds. Take th e rule fa n Jring interpretation in 
accordance \\·ith gener a l)~· pren1iling m ea n in g as an ex ample . The 
classicist w ould impose it on contn1ctin g par t ies as a requirem ent. T h e 
neoclassicist ',vould rely on it on ly absent a con trary shu\ving of actu a l 
intent , reasoning tha t the parties probably sh a red its underlying as-
sumption , a nd there fore that it.s use p robabl y \\·ill ach·an ce their ac-
tual exp ectations. 
The neoclassicist \\ o ulc! fin d it especially easy to justify using 
these rul es to ascert a in the rnean ing of term s in debt contracts govern-
ing large loans. Trust indenture and loan agreem ent form s te nd to be 
insp ec ted again a nd again hy experienced corporate 1aw)·ers as th e_,. 
at tem pt to p rO\ ide ans\\ers to ~dl forsee<:tb! e quest ions \Yith in the four 
curner:; of the clocu nwnt . Su c h ia\\ :'t' rs expect t heir con tracts to be 
interpreted in accord \\· it h sta:-!clard E nglish US<1ge and sta ndard rul es 
of interpret ation. Thus. the ~ tan c!<tr cl ru les \\· ill tend to p rod u ce m e<m-
ings correspo nding to th e nw<; ni ny:s attached by the d rafters of such 
' I 1 f · , ' , ' . l , ' '1 ' \\t'L-c, r c'ut e cl contracts. ano. prcs unL; Dly , t t!l'H.' lJY \Y J1 pro tect tnc 
t=-''\ l.)f'et :.-"1-L,~') ll S nf thu 1 -' 1 t(~ ~~e ....; +-t-:-r1 n ·t,·t if'S 
-· J.. ~ - ~ ... I.. • • 11 \.... , l i . . '---'--"- ' .t-'" ~ '- ~ .... . . 
T his section considers th e application to debt con tr acts of another 
hornbook rule of interpretation---the maxim of intemretation con t ra 
' ' 
2
" ld. ~§ 202( 1 )-!2) . 203( a). 
' ' Id. § 203 (bHcl). 
------ ·- ·-- - - --------
C:ourts rnake o.n-1pl e use of these rulc:·s nf int::~ rp re t::l t ion in debt contract case .. s . See . e .g . . 
Broad v . .Rockvvell I nf l Corp .. 6-!2 F.:2d 92D. 0-17 (.5th C ir. )(en bane) (effect to ail terms), ce rt . 
c!enied . 454 U.S. 965 ( 1981 )~ Prescott, Ball (X Tul ben v. LTV Corp., .5.31 F. Supp. 21:3. 21 8 
(S .D .l'J .Y. 198 1) (>arne): Sh aron S teel Corp., .. Chase ;\!anhattan Ba n k, N .A .. 321 F . Supp . 10-l. 
127-23 (S .D .N .Y. 1981) (specific terms o··:er general terrns). C!ffd in p art. reY 'd in pa rt, 691 F .2cl 
l039 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. den ied, 103 S. Ct. i?.S:3 ( !CJ83 ): Zeiler v . \Vork \'>'car C orp .. -!.SO F. 
Supp . 891. SB.S- 96 (S.D .N .Y. 1 978~ ("~· ffr:c t to a li tern1s) . 
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projerentem, or, interpretation against the drafter. The Restatement 
(Second) styles this a rule of "construction"' as \\·ell as interpretation.~~; 
Corbin calls it a rule of "last resort. " 27 Either way, the judge applies it 
only \vhen the process of interpretation produces t\Hl or more reason-
able meanings and he needs a basis for choosing among them. ::s U n-
derlying the rule is the assumption that the drafter knm\·s more than 
the other parties about the document's inner \Yorkings and inherent 
ambiguities. The rule alle\·iates this inherent informational disparity 
by forcing him to accomplish his purposes clearly and in plain Yiew. :2u 
As such, it proYides a tool for judicial regu lation of the imposition of 
standard form contracts by parties with superior bargaining pm\·er. 
Courts routineh· inn!ke the rule in debt contract cases. "0 This 
seems appropriate at first glance. D ebt contracts follow standard 
forms. Their complexity makes it possible for a drafter to bury a 
surprise directive unfa\·orable to the other side deep \\·ithin the form ·s 
convoluted paragraphs. But further inspection leads tu questions as to 
'" See Restatement (Second) of Contracts§ '20fi comnwnt u ( 19Sl). The Restatement (Second) 
catalogues thi:; traditional rule with a r:;roup of rules descriht'd ;:c; embodving considerations of 
"fairness and the public interest. " E.g .. id. §~ '20:3. '20S (gond fairh: ltncomcinnabilit::). 
" .3 A. Corbin. Contracts§ .'5.59 (l9G0). 
"· See Restatement (Second) of Contract.'§ '206 (lDSl): Franklin Life In.l. Co. v. Common-
wealth Edison Co .. 4.Sl F. Supp. 602,616 (S .D. Ill. lUI'S!, alf'd per curiam . .598 F.'2d 1109 (7th 
Cir.). cert. denied. c\44 U.S. 900 (1979). 
'" See Restatement (Second) of Contr~!Cl\ § '2()6 corn!lll'llt ,, 1 ]!),''11 
'" See. C)!. .. Bm:>d ·:. Hocb\e!l lnt'l 
denied. 404 LJ .. S '16.'5 il ~)S l). 
Calling "contra prnf('rcntcnl"' a .. nile:· n\·ersL:~tL·s n·lattc·rs :-;i:nu.''.\·hat In practicl', the doc-
trine is su rnalcahle '.ha t it r2.reh· a ('(_HJrt fnlnl cloin< ;_\:; it Cnn."idcr thrcL' debt 
contract cases, '-'ach dt:~'iclcrl in the Southt·r:-! 1)1 scrict 
In Pn:-scott, .Ball 8;:- Turben v. LT\/ 21:3 iS.D :\.Y. l')Sl) . the court 
began its discu5sion by noting that it '- \:as bound by .. the b~::iic r'_Jie cf •2untract cor~s truction v-;hich 
requires a cou.rt to resoh·e ambiguities in an agreernent :?..g::;.inst tftc par ty \\'hich dnlfted :he 
agreement." Id. ~1 t 217. ··['T]he or:.ly \';ay in '-\-~tich defe:ndants cna~· pre'-·ail." the court 'Ycnt on, 
·'is if the tern·ts of the Trust Indenture . clear." I d. But the defendants 
prevailed any,~:ay, though the .language at least \\·as see inEra ;-JOtes 7()--80 <Jnd 
accompanying text. The court hr:1d no trouble ordering its lnquiry ~o avoid the doctrine's 
constraints. 
In Zeiler '.'. \'·Jo rk \-\"e;_u Corp .. -LSO F. Supp. 
intpnsing the- "rule" on -:ht· i:-;suL' r defer:dant <-tS follO\\ ·s: 
D ~< . Y lU7t~). the cuurt aYuidcd 
\\rhilc it is tr'L' th~tt this rule of con~LlctuaJ ~ntt·Ipu~·tJ.tinn 
any uf thcn1 fur to 
a gi\'t:n prn~:isiun. The tcrrn~:i oF the debc:nttlrt-s n;ust d:erc·f()rt' be cnnstn1cd in 
of the, c:onte\t and all c-ircunlst:.-:.nces.,. nn :natter \\·ho \\·::l:; rc_.sponsi-
ble fur thenl. 
Id. at 894 (citutinn ornitted). Fer _ ti:c cnurt citL·d Bu,.::hnl~L1 ·,,. _ .-\nv:TiccL1 .Fea rn Ht-:bber 
Corp .. 2.50 F . Supp. 60 IS .D. "'-; _y_ l9C~:S). a cast' that also acl<:;;!nced the p~·uposition that "dnubt 
or 
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whether the factual assumptions supporting the rule obtain in the debt 
contract context . Take first a loan agreem ent drafted for a priYate 
placement bet\n;en a large corporate borrower and an institutional 
lender. Judicial inten ·ention to adjust an imbalance of bargaining 
pO\\·er seems unnecessary. So lon,g as both si des are represented by 
experienced counseL the potential for drafting abuse seems unlikely to 
be realized. The more experienced the counseL the more arbitran· a 
judicial decision based on parties · allocation of drafting responsibili-
ties at the negotiating table. 31 
Trust indentures present a different problem, as they tend to be 
drafted by counsel for the underwriters. The underwriters cease to be 
parties interested in the contract immediately after the securities' 
initial issue and sale. As a result, when a dispute between the issuer 
and the bondholders arises at some later date, there is no drafter 
against whom to interpret. The issuer might be selected as a second 
choice, since it attended the negotiations and had the po\ver to influ-
ence the drafting. But this seems a tenuous basis for ascribing to it an 
outcome-determinative fault. Particular issuers have no real role in 
drafting the boilerplate in stand ard trust indenture forms. The very 
need for standardization makes it unlikely that anyone involved in the 
transaction \vould propose changes in such language. Moreover, the 
public availability of standard trust indenture forms gives institutional 
bond investors equal reason to know of their contents and equallong-
tern1 ability to influence the drafting process . 3z 
31 OF cou rse , one coul d ·inquire lntu th e fc ia ti \·c capabiiitit:~ uf the parti es · r(:Specti\· e cou nsel 
and base the ru ie's application or: the rc-sul t. Courts ha\·e occBsionaHy done so . Sec. e.g . , Gulf (J il 
C orp . ·; . Arncrican La. P ipe Line C o .. 23 :2 l7 .:2d ::-~0 1. -HJ-l (6 th C ir. l 060) {n uting that counsel 
•.:,:~JS "skilled in t his field of the lCJ.\:.·"): \Veil ~nd TofJL & \l f.L<. Co ..... \\'hitn (~y . .J .. J lll. 2d lO.S. l 1 l . 
. 151 N. E .2d ·242 1 24S (1 96~)~~ (no tin_g th at drafte r \Va:~ ··a la\\·yer 'xith a nurnbe r of ~:ears 
e.\~~-f; rience as :1 teg2.l adYisnr !n con11:H~r cicd tra n::;i:ict io r;s" ). B1tt detern1in.::d ptirsuit of Lhe inquiry 
probabl y '-.V0 td d }J toch~c t:.· a r;0Inplex colla teral ju ri:;p nldence unapi::;. r-;aiing to t he har t!nd l ac:kin .~ 
in both e ffi c ie ncy ~u:J f"it rJ c~:~ . A t a ll events . cvtnpetent cuu n~;e l fairly can b e ass UITHS~ ir: res pcc·t 
uf all o f th e d ebt cont ract ca~· i~:-; t his Arti e: ie di scus.<:es . 
~~ But it rnu :~t ~-dsr ) hL· no 1.r:d that lt·~:) :'uphi~;ticutt•d indi, ·id t! cd bl~I )d in\· 1 .. :.qtlrs ~,~,·ill il ( l( f1a\ ·e thi . ..; 
i un~-t-~-rrn abil ity to infllt l' r !Cl' tht_' Jrat-tin g prur::L'S.'i . F~iulti n~ .)Jrch in'. t•stor~ fnr t h~· un\_r~cd po,,·L· r 
uf rich z: r tt nd be tl~' r-i nfunncd in '."l'St::r:) !n a ~· be 'I!1Ltir. 
!n Bn)ad ,._ Hock'.\·c\ 1 In t 'l r .. ~ c.r p .. (i -L2 F.:2d ~J :2U . !-) -± ~ n .:2i_l ( )th C ir. .!( (.' l\ h~utc· i . c:..· <.:rt. ch· n i ~_·c i. 
.. ~ :) -t i_'. S. :-f)(j (.! HS 1 ) . t h z· Fi !' th C:irc;;i{ S l! ~! .1:!: l':-:h thrtt h o l cL· : ~~ - ~ i :~ rurr_· h~l.'-;t' l' S frn!-:1 i.!!1clf: r\1.' (i tc rs. 
(_'( :~:ld h(' r()und l:-l st;:incl !rl th :..· 1_;ncL·t\'-Titcr< shoes For pt:q)n.'ic\ nf i: : t ~·rp ~t·t H tinn {'{)}1/;'(1 prnf(',l'( ll -
f ;;:n -.r·h ~ tc·\t ~tbn~. ·~ -· is in !. t_·ndl:cl t(J tcbi l t this :; tt':!~e:-;ti;)n. 
'' Scl~ \ L.:. cne-i; _ .\t i p r~ ! 7 ~nte t). at ;--,,(; () _ ,·~:-) . I·:l sc\';h c·r t' . PnlFvs.s(J I \LY.:n~.: i! ~ :r:~uc·s t h;.t t ch:h t 
ct.'i '! l l~ tc-l.s 111~ •:• nqt ;-,t, .. i. t'L.ltin ;!a: .· · \ L tC'l lL H. l:->:•i ilP i1 1ic .-~\naly.-.; i s ('l l. Contra(:t :::_d H ~·i at ions : I t. .. : 
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alterations of neoclassical rules for the debt cont ract context ach·ance 
neoclassical ends. T he only absolu te in n eoclassical interpre tatio n is 
th e fl exible rule that words b e "'interpreted in light of all the circum-
stances, " 3 ~ and the rul e 's supporting assumption th a t \\ ords d o not 
ha\'e immutable m eanings . A corollary also bears m ention: T he more 
one kno\vs about the context in \\·hich the w ords a rc used . the more 
likely that one's interpre tation \\ill accord ,.,·ith the parties' expec ta-
tions. 
This neoclassical contextualism undercuts the cl assical require-
m ent that p arties clearly manifest their expectat ions in sta ndard En-
glish prose . This conflic t beh\·een the t\Yo sch ools custon1 ::nily a rises 
with respect to the admission of extrinsic eddence of meaning. The 
classicists em p lm· standa rd E nglish usage as a bar to an expanded 
inquiry into contex t - if the m eaning of the \\· orcls is "'plain .. to the 
judge, no ex trinsic e\·idence as to m eani n _g is ad missibl e : e\·idence is 
admissible onlv if t he \Y ords a re unclear \\·hen read \\'ithin the four 
corners of the docu ment. L> In contrast , the neocl assica l d enia l nf the 
immutability of \\'Ords causes the pl a in m eaning har to cli s<.1 ppear. If 
one has no \\·ay of kno\\'in g \vhether or not the langu age is clea r un til 
all the circumstances ha\·e been considered . it follo\\·s th at e\:trinsic: 
eviden ce must be admi t ted f-o r in terpreta t ion p ur poses despite the 
a pparent cl ar itY of the te:'l:fs meaning . J li 
T he in terp ret i,·e conFlict bet\\ een plain mc·aning :1nd context 
does not end once ext ri ns ic eYicle nce has been ad mitted . T he court st ill 
m ust clccicle \'>hich of t he h \·u C' nnpetin _;z me<m in.L>:s. one " p lain .. and 
the other derinxl From the e.\tr inc;ic e\·idence. ca rri e:·: more \\ c·ight . 
Shortfall s and the :\ccd fo r a ··g ich C laosificaton· A.ppar,rt>rs ... 7.'5 :\\•: . U. L i\(·\· JOlS . il)-! :: 
(l 9o l ). B11 t the •ina h·.sis in the tnt \"> ill sho\\' that thL'\ are . Their rtla tiona: aspect:.; sinr ph· an· k s.; 
fu nd amental th,;n tlwsc of n;am· o the r con trac t relatiocs. su~· h as o u tp u t. requirements a nd 
excl usin :: elL-a li ne; co nt racts . 
34 See Restatemen t (Second) oi Co ntrac ts § 202(1) (198 1) . For appli ;;ation of th e rLJ ll3 in ,! 
debt con tract case, sec, e .g . . Buchn: an \· . An1er ican Foan1 Rubber Corp., 250 F. Supp. 60. ?.S 
(S.D .N. 1· . l %5 ) 
3
-" For ad \·ocacy of tht· plain n1eanin _~ ru le iri contract in te rpretation . see T-fol rnc;.; . The 
Th eon· of Lec;<~i l ntc r pretatiun . 12 Han·. L. HC\' . -!17 . -1'20 (1899) . Fw '' contt·mpor<.w; d iscus-
.s io n of th e mic' s 11se in statL:tu l\ intcqEdat ion. :;ee \ Jurph:- ·. O ld :'1 \axi rm ~<L"-,·c; r D ie: T he " P !a in -
\ !ean ing Rule .. cmd :":itatuton· !n tl' rpretat ion in the " \ icdern .. Feclerul Co1::·ts. 7.'5 Lclum . L 
Rt.· \. 129rJ rlD7.'i l 
Je See Pacific Cas & £lee . Co . \·. c;_ \V . Thornas L>r ay~1ge & Higging Co . . S~-! Cal. 2d :33 . :y~). 
442 P .2d 641. 645. 69 Cal. Hpt r . 5(-ii. 5 65 (.l96bi(Tra\T:or. C . .f. \ {"The fac:: th :;( the tern-, :; t)k :.:n 
inst rurn ent ap pear clear to a j ud~e does not preclude th e pos::;ibiiity th.8t th :.' patties ·.::·ilc~e th~· 
language of the inst ru rn en t tr. express differe nt teEns .... J: :3 A. Corbin , .~ur:r:.-:. not2 2.1 . ~ .572B 
(Supp . 1 H7 1 )~ Hc:st a te rn cnt {Second) of Contr;.tcts § :212 co n1o~ c- nt b (.UJ~::l} . 
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Neoclassical doctrine specifies no .. correct .. mode of anah·sis at this 
point. \Vhen confronted \\ ith t\HJ competing meanings, the neoclassi-
cist wilL of course. test them out .. in the particular context,·· but will 
not discount the force of standard usage. As the late Judge Robert 
Braucher, a leading neoclassicist, wrote: ·'The transaction may be 
shown in all its lem::th and breadth, but 'the words themselves remain 
the most important e\ idence of intention: to put them altogether aside 
may at times be necessary but it ah\·ays sonW\\ hat sa\·ors of usurpa-
tion.' "l~ 
Thus. the decisin· stage of neoclassical interpretation consists of 
an ad hoc balancing \\'hich is cognizant of classical \·alues. Part II of 
this Article examines t he dynamics of this balancing process in con-
temporary debt contract cases. Part III entluate.~ the competing inter-
pretiYe norms an1ilahle for debt contracts. 
II. CASES 
Interpretation cases tun;, on their O'.'.T\ facts. NeH·rtheless. some 
generalizations can be made about the dynamics of t he decision proc-
ess. The follm\·ing discussion of debt contract interpretation makes a 
fe\\ such generalizations. It relies on t\H) assumptions in so doing: 
First, contractual language lacks clarity by de~~rees: and second. judi-
cial inter,:ention in contractual relationship-; becomes more strongly 
justified e~s the gon·rning contract pro\·isions become less clear. 
Tvvo types of cases define the extremes. At one extreme lies the 
case of the cleac contract provision. H ere, tb e judge plays a passive, 
ministerial role , enforcing the provision unless some overriding law or 
policy bars the >.vay. Iviost standard deb t contract provisions lie at this 
extrem (" . F or example, \Vhen . upon a payment default, the lender 
accder :xtes and dem ands jud grnent tor the enti re outstanding princi-
oal ano \Jnt, the .standa:cd form orovides d ear directions and no inter-, ' 
p retation qu estion arises. Such a case rarely results in litigatio:-138 since 
. ' . 1 , r· J. fl. , Ir ]1 r 1 t •' •' t d l' t. t _ne f:x ·pect ec.. be:ner1L \!1ere, zero) - a.z.1s r ar sn.or _ ot c11e expec e 1 1ga-
rion costs. i\t the other extreroe lies the case of the entirely unclear 
coT:ti:r s.ct oro1:ision. H ere, vvhether the interpreter reads the provision 
E ffect in the Scc:ond Restat ement of Contracts. 81 
Cc;iu:n. L . Hev. 13. l6- l7 (J_SOl';(quotin_g Robert 1:r:dus .. ln c. -.·. 
Sec. C ;_~_·e~;. 5_1:3 F. 
.'362 Mass. 151, 75.'5. 291 
UD F.2d 376. 380 (2d Cir. 
disc~_::. ::t=: s u:' i.:;sue :;t en1rn ing frorn v.·h2t cotdd bf::' ccn.\ iderccl a clear pro .. ·i::;icn. The court tnrns to 
the diction::n y to g i1.:e ··si:all" its .irnp ~ ;:'c. t iYe n1eani~1g 'sith respect to a trust ind~nture provi.sion 
that ::!-H~ -Lrl_lS t e·~' .. sh:-111"' g-i..,.·e the holders notice of c\·ents of default. 1d. ct 641. 
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within the four corners of the docu ment or within the circumstances 
as a whole, interpretation fails to point to any particular meaning, 
plain or otherwise. As a result, judicial intervention to supply a term is 
a precondition to enforcement. Such a case might arise respecting a 
debt contract if a technical financial term were left undefined and 
standard business usage offered an array of reasonable denotations. 
Few cases arise at this extreme, either, as debt contracts tend to be too 
well drafted to leave entire fields of subject matter open to judicial 
intervention . 
There follows a comparative anal ysis of seven debt contract 
cases, 39 all arising between the poles. The cases deal w ith ::on tract 
provisions lacking clarity in differing degrees and thus raise q u estions 
of proportionately differing degrees of difficulty . Conflicts of propor-
tionately differing intensity arise betv.,een plain m eanings and mean-
ings derived from context . 
A. Cases Interpretin g Open- Ended Proc isions 
Even complex contracts occasionally contain pronswm left 
\ague by design. The drafter structures the pro\· isio n to co\·er a con-
cretely envisioned situation. But the drafter recogni zes the possibility 
of related future situations unforeseeable in many p articula rs . Consid-
erati ons of th e limits of the hum a n ima .~ination or the poli t ics o f th e 
particular tr ansaction cause postponement of a prec ise cl rafting cl eci-
sion as to these contingencies . The draFt tT accomplishes this by draft-
ing broadly and \agueh enough to hrin~ such cases \\i th in t he prO\i .. 
s1on s arguable scope . Such draftint..; imp licit h· im· itcs jilclicial 
inten·enti on to establish tht• pro\·ision ':. prt•c is:c· paranwL·c; . Su ch p ro-
\ isions ap pear in all cl eht co ntrctds . '' i 
The debt contrac t's stand ard "successor ob ligor c lat ise" 1 i has this 
open-ended design. It requires the p mch ctscr of " al l or sn bstan t ia ll y 
11
' T he SC'\·en case~ do not co n~t i tutc tl con-Ipl~:tc C!_dl t·ctinn ~ )f conte!npura ry dl'bt cnnt r~iCt 
cases. But the sarnple is broad cncu ,gh to afford ~t b·:i.sis for this .-\ r ti c1l.·':.; C()nclu2'i nns a bouL th e 
jud icia l in terpretat io n p rocess. ()ther debt COilt r :.::ct Ct.1Sf::'~ ar~_· di:;cus~ed in Hr~·ttt0 n. s 11pr:J. no tr; 1:2.. 
'
1
' S11c !t jlr< l\ ·i.·;i! J!1 _..., arv JI)()J'l· iil ...: l~u ; ,_Lt l f ; ; , ,ri; ·: iJil.";t i i! dL·:\tit i-:.· ;., tl t:J : I i rl l(J; tr l ~~~~ rl·t· -
IIH._·n t~;. \_ )pc tt-cndt.:cl prtJ\· ! ~ i ( ll1."; apptiL\.thlt· tc1 htrr nr\\ ' tT~ ,_ -. ·it!: '.\ ·idt· ly di(fL·rtTii ~~ ·har~ iCt« · : ·i :.;t i v:-. \t· n T 
thl' p L: hl ic,. _•; Ilt..·l·d l'rrr ."Lt nda rdiz~ t t ! I!Il. 
;( The .\ j (/dcl indc i1i t lfl::~ s~uH p ll· -,ttcc t.: .... srH· .jhii\.!rn· : . · !~ t ! J.-...:..· JI!'·J\ i(lt· :-; : 
The Co!np;_tn:· :·dltd l I !til. (.'r ;Jl'()l idatl' \\ 'it.h i l!' J)\i_·r:_:t· ir:i; l ~ lf l\' ( d hr·r l' ( li'PI rr~d jqj] ; l l' 
11) th e L'( Jrpt il'Uli() Jl fnr !I ll'd !J:-· :-:tJ L"iil '< r]idctii:)JI 1;r iJl t( ; \·· ·hi ch t! rr.· (:~nr: ;"~~ tn \· i" 
JLcr~D.:d (:r thl' PL'f\tl ll \\·h ich aL·(p!irL·:-- h:. vPn-..·t·:,·anl··· flr tr<:Il."':ft· r tl1•.· : ~ r' l !IL'rtit·."> 
<l \ ~ l i'! L'Jdi r v t\· "hall fn.· t ! c·: rrt1t:l'<tt ir lil . . 
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all" of the borro\ver's assets to assume the indebtedness governed by 
the contract, and makes the purchase of "all or substantially all" of the 
borrower's assets by a nonassuming purchaser an event of default. The 
phrase "substantially all'' is vague and could be drafted more con-
cretelyY But it embodies an efficient compromise. T he lender wants 
the borrower's existing assets, or at least ''substantially all" of them, 
kept intact to protect its investment. The borrower \vants the freedom 
both to dispose of minor assets and to effect fundamental corporate 
changes without the lender's permission. The '·substantially all the 
assets" concept, highly developed in corporate law, 43 occupies com-
State or the Di.,trict of Columbia. and shall express\\· assume. b\ an indenture 
supplt:rncntal hereto. executed and delin:?recl to the Trustee. in form satisfac-
ton· to the Trustee. the clue and punctual pan11ent of the principal of (and 
premium. if am) and interest on all the Debentures and the performance of 
eYen· cm·cnant of this Indenture on the part of the Compam· to be performed 
or obserYed: 
!2) immediate~\- after gi\·ing effect to such transaction. no E\·ent of Default. 
and no e\·cnt which. after notice or lapse of time, or both. \\'Otrld become an 
En~nt of Default. shall ha\ e happened and be continuing: and 
(.3) the Company has deli\-erecl to the Trustee an Officers' Certificate and an 
Opittion of Counsc·l each stalinL: that such consolidation. merger, conn~~:ance 
or transfer and such supplemental indenture comph \\ith this A.rticle and that 
all conditions precedent herein prm·iclccl for relating to such transaction han~ 
been complied \\·ith. 
ABF Commentaries, supra note I, at 292 (sample provision § S-1) 
Upon any consolidation or n1erger, or any con\·eyance or transfer of the proper-
ties and asset.' of the Company substantiall\· as an entiret\ in accordance \Vith 
Seriion 8Ul. the successor corporation formed b\ such corEoliclation or into which 
the Con1pany is rnerged or to 1.i,rhjch such con\·eyance or tr::tnsfer is rnade shall 
succeed to, and be substituted for_ ctnd n1ay exerci.sc e~:ery right and pcnver of. the 
Con1pany under this Indenture \vith the sc:u11e effect as if :;uch succe:;sor corporation 
had been named as the Con1pany herein: procidcd. hou'et:er , that no such convey-
ance or tr<Jnsfer shall have the effect of releasing the Person named as the "'Cum-
panu ·· in the First paragraph of t his instrument or any succc;ssor corporation which 
shall theretofore ha\·e becorne such in the n1anner prescribed in thi~ Article frorn its 
liability ::1.s uhligor and rnak::-.·r on any of the Debenture.:~ or cot~pnns. 
[d. at .29.5~9:3 (sarnple pro\·ision § S-2)(italics in origina1.). 
1:: For exan:ple. a fl),ed percentage of bouk Yalue r~1ight be :;et to d.<2-fine ··substantially all" the 
::=t.:~set.s. The ~.1ode1 Indenture appears to reject rigid lin1itations on an issu er's ability to dispose of 
a-;set.s. It does pro\·ide a san1ple clause requiring prepaynv:~n t of d portion of indebtedness as a.ss::::ts 
2rc sold, id. at .:.}':27-:28 (san1ple pio\·ision § 10-13 ex::1.n1ple :3), but notes that such clauses are 
rarel:,· t!secL id. 8\:: ·± 2...!: . .. Iu n1ost cases ." it notes, "nu c.tten1pt i:::; !t! <::dc to pro-,·ide a definition of 
'substantially an·, e\·cn though there is no generall~· recop.:nized definition of that tern-1 ... 10. at 
n.l. 
43 See ~riodel Business 
cast~ interpreting the 
C~irnbel ··:.Signal Cos., .31t3 A.2d 
all" concept). affd per curiarn, :316 
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promise ground. substantially protecting each side's inte rests \\·hile 
saving the costs of negotiating a more spec ific pro\ ·ision. 
B. S. F. Co. c. Philadelphia i\'ational Bank14 concerned a successor 
obligor clause governing a n im·estm ent company borrO\\ er. Se\ e nty-
five percent of t h e value of the borrower's assets lay in a block of 
common stock of a single manufacturing company. The bornm·er sold 
this stock , taking the p osition that the stock did not consti tute .. sub-
sta nti ally all .. of its assets w ithin the m eaning of th e clause . It dre\\ 
upon an old comm on la\\ doctrine under which assets sol d did not 
amount to ·'substantialh· a ll .. the assets \\here the sale ach ·ancecl th e 
selling corporation's purposes. •·" The borro\\'er had h eld the stock for 
the purpose of m ai ntai ning \\ or king control O\'er the ma n ufacturin g 
company, but such \\·orking control had been lost. Therefore . it ar-
gued , the sale advanced its purposes . and as such. \\·as not of ··substan-
tiall v all" the assets . 46 
The court rebutted this contextual argu men t \\·ith <:\ different 
contextual argument . It emphasized the p rO\ ision·s pu rpose of pro-
tecting the lenders a ,gainst dissipation of th e borrO\\·er's asset base . T he 
debentureholders h a d rel ied on the block of stock in ,·a luin g the 
debentures. Therefore, accom plishin g th e prm'i.sion "s p rotcc tin· pur-
pose req u ired a finding that .. s ubsta ntial!~ all .. the assets had been 
solelY 
The court's resu lt fo ll o\\'S from bnth classical and nt'(Ydassica l 
perspect ives . T he da.s:;icist \Hlll lcl agree th at the proYision·s \·agu t·rwss 
necessi tates iudicial line-d r;cnvinu . But since seventv-five nercent fa lls J ·'::' , .1_ 
with in a '> ery standard usage m eanin g nf .. substantially all. .. the 
court's line of rea:::onin\..( better respects \\·hat li tt le intcgrit\ the lan-
gu age possesses . The language's \·agueness p re\·en ts the nen•:.:lassic ist 
From being absolutely certain that a giYen r~:·s ult fu lly acco rds\\ ith the 
partie< expectations. The neoclassicist . according!) . \\·ill make refe r-
ence to context in order to a~ce rtain \\·hich meanin~ nwrl· p rob ably 
advances expectations . In B.S. F., the probabili ties favor the meaning 
ch osen by the cour t . Tying th e deb t obligat ion to t he borHl\\·er' s asset 
base is the pro\· ision·s centr<:d business func tion from the lencle r·s point 
of 'lie\\' . The .. purpose" tes t proposed by the borro\Yer. in co n trast. 
" 42 Del Ch . 106, :20-J A.2d ~-i6 :l9o~) . 
45 See, e.g .. L ange\'. Re~~:_· ~\·ati0n \lining r~'-\. Srn el ting Co .. -~S \\ 'nsh . 167. ~J:3 P. l O:') r J90S) 
(case cited b\ the issue r in B.S. F.) 
'" B. S.F . ~:2 Del. Ch. at ll O. 20-t A.:2cl at 7-19. 
" ld . at ll.S , :20-l A .:2cl a t /.S:~. 
1984] :387 
stems from old law regulating stockholders' relations v,:ith the corpo--
rate entity and has no bearing on the business needs of either part-y. 
B.S.F. is a relatively easy case. The more recent Sharon Steel 
Corp . v. Chase A1anhattan Bank, N .A. ,-~s also in volving the standard 
successor obligor clause, presented a more difficul t problem . There. 
the issuer of bonds and debentures liquidated on a piecemeal basis . 
First it sold a substantial division. Then it sold a smaller division and 
secured its stockholders' approval of a "Plan of Liquidation and Disso-
lution. " 49 After this, only one operating divisi on remained . Before the 
piecemeal liquidation started, this division had produced thirteen 
percent of the issuer's profits and thirty-eight percent of its revenues , 
and h ad comprised thirty-four percent of the book value of its fixed 
assets and forty-one percent of its operating assets. 50 The issuer found 
a buyer for this division, and the t\vo entered into an agreement 
providing that the buyer assume the issuer '::; outstandin g bonds and 
debentures .s' The issuer and buyer took th e position that this sale 
constituted a "sale" of "all assets" vvithin the mea ning of the successor 
obligor clause. binding the bond and c!ebentureholders to the buyer's 
- u . 1 . 1 • . h 1 l 1 -1 1 1 - _, l l assumptwn . 'nder t11s an;.uy-s ts, t , e oonc ano (_..eoenturenoloers cou c 
not declare a default. "2 
The bond and debentu reholdcrs objected . claiming that, for pur-
-·ose- of arnl\r~na +he S'lr· ~ers"~ ("Ji-J1l' {rr--: r cl,-· ;j f''-\ L; ... c.. l. '' ll '·r'- r'l <:;'~:::'.t. : ... ·~-.~ (,:. _(:-- ~ -!Jl" .·'-'· 6 ,, ".l vC .), '.n · < ;-,'~" Hh _,, , , , c.dG :; ___ (. ~ c•_,C,t:: ,),.,)~ 
shotllcl fla-ve been calculated as of tl1e t irne the i~~suer fcr"ITJtdated the 
' r 1' . l . -] 1 1 - ' - ' 1 f. , , . Dla n or _Iqmc.atwn. t nc.er tms analVSJS. the s::ue :::. t.ne last overat;rt::z 
... ~ -· !_ ~-"' 
division constittrted c_ sale o utside Df tl-.te r.;latt3-e- becr~:- ~se tJ~c- c1i·lis_~~;rl 
cor.1ta.irtecl s t1bstan.tiall~l les:~; tha11 :Jn.{~ - h·~~tf of {ht issu er~s ~~ ... ~<.:_;::- t s calcu-
latec] rrt the tirne uf forrrttll ~ction of iJ~~e jJt~;_n :_' \ us. C}re i:·~~ue·: ' 'S sul-).~~-:~~ -
uue11t 1Jissol t1tlon \Vot.dcl ·be 
.I 
ur1 der t}le !~rust ir1derrtures. 53 
-", Id. 
': ··;;• 
l . - • . , • • 
,,-:_'.P.: t n ~ t ; ~t: Cl·:. r;~ ;-; ::: _l rc_:_ 
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The case shew. eel th e successor obligor clause \\·orking at cross 
p urposes';"-the clause's p urpose of offering the issuer fl exibility in 
accomplishing fundam ent al corporate changes supported one inter-
pretation , \\ ·bile its purpose of keeping the debt obligation tied to the 
issuer's asset base supported another. Any decision, th erefore, had to 
impair one party"s expectat ions to some extent."" The Court of Appeals 
for the Second C ircuit ruled for the hold ers. breaking this impasse by 
assessing the probabili t ies and adopting the least impairing m eaning: 
\\'he re co ntr ac tual langua ge seems desi gned to protect the in teres ts 
of both p ar ti es an d " he re confl ic tin g interp retat ions a re a rg ued , 
th t• cont ract shoul d be co nstr ued to sac rifice the principal interes ts 
of each pa rt \· as lit tle as possible. An inte rpreta ti o n \\ ·h ich sac rifi ces 
a major interes t of one of the pa rties \\·hile furth ering onh· a 
margi nal interes t of the other sho uld be rejec ted in faHJ r of a n 
in ter p retat ion "hid : sacr ifices m urgin al int erests of both p a rties in 
o rd e r tt1 protec t th l'i r major co nce rns . "·" 
The court bal an ced the in terests in fan H of th e holders. The holders" 
interpn:·tat ion \\ 'O tllcl leaYe th e issuer·s interest in fl exibility largely 
llliimpaired: all kin ds of fun d am en ta l corporate chan ges still co uld be 
strl iCll irccl '.Y it h in the cl au se. In con tras t. the issuer 's interpret ation 
'.\ Dul d npen a ';i ~ni fic an t loophole t h rou~;h \Yhich issuers could use 
> l~quc·n t ial liquid at ions to .':eparate their debt obli.~a tiom; from th ei r 
:~ ~s et 1J a~es . 
T he cor:t;.~xtn al circum':tances favored the holders less heavilv 
th<:tli the Second C ircu ir"s opinion indicates . The Model Indentur~ 
u;nta ins ;~\ co\·en ant ex'1;licith· 1Drohibit im: the sort of oiecemeal asset ~ '... ) .I: 
sa] c:- ~:. nci U tji .. ll c1~_;l tio :n. e:c. rri eel out in Sharon Steel. 57 -rhe Shara n Steel 
."'..; -~-ht.• ' . .'Ot i.i·t i1lade (lpproprlately shcn :-;hrift uf il iitera! reading that fa\·or~d the issuer. 
Under ~t ditT~·r;_•nt literal reading . " a~scts " C.:U tLl d includt· the und istri bu ted p roCt.' t.Xls uf the earii e r 
-,;_dt• . ..; _ Fr_ ;Cc:)ta llj:1,t! appli t·Jt ion of th e cl allSL' to th ::: L!st purchaser. rd . :t t 10-lD . 
. ') .~ I:;' a rn~ •s urth ~1ot e:.; t!Ltt "p il rpn::;e i!l t ~: rpretatiu n" is a problen1a ti c exercise b!.:Ca use difft>re nt 
;J:?.rt if:.\ t·.) H s:ng:1f' contract can l::.! \·c different pur po~e.-;. lie suggests that a "reason to kno,, ... test 
l>:· ust·d ;_n h r ( · ~1k t ht.· i rnpa.-; .-.:c : ··lt :>t e rn~' proper to re u:ard one party ':-~ assent to th e agreern ent \Vith 
~: ! 1()\';lt:'d.~l' :-~ }" t il ( ' f'.th e:- p;..! rty 's r:.::cnerc.l purpost~:·i h S ~-". ~ rot :nd fo r n.::~oh· i nt:!: doubts in fa\\)f of a 
~-n l'::.:t nin~ t h ~~. t \\·itl !'u rth.:_'r t hrJ .'-: £_' ~.:- nels . r ~..ithc :- tha n a nJt'a nin_g that \\·ill Fr ustrate thern." E . 
F3rns-..;, · ur~h . S!!p ra nutl:· ~) . ~ -:- . ji_}. at ·4 ~)-~. Tht.' p rnb ltTi l \\·ith t his a pproach is tha t the fa ult 
id entified ~-~:ill rJt:,t nt· ·:· L·:-~:' <i. r ily nb tai n on l'i rher .~id t< •Jr. ~1.s in Sharon Steel. it \\·ill obt ain eq_ual ly 
iJl i ~) (Jth sides . 
:,r: Slu.uou Steel . ~-;:) 1 F .:2d wt 10.:51. 
Suhj e:.:t tc :h~.:- pnl\· i.-:i, __. ns of ,-\r ti•_·ic- Ei _~!hL the Cornpany \'>·ill no t cnn\·ey . t ransfer or 
lt·:t::;c: . ;tny sL 1-hLtn t i~:l pa rt of its :.!:-::..;et :.; 1. :n l e~~s . in th e op in ion () f the Beard of 
!)i l f:·(:tors, ~ ~:,:_'h cu :: \·eyilnc.c_~ . t;·a:Jsft· r o r le a:-;t·. co nside:·cd togt_·t h!::r -..•:ith a ll prio r 
c•.:::: ··: t..~ y;ln cc.'; . t : ~~n:J;_· r.-; <.tn d l e~~s cs nf a~~ set s c) f th e C orn pa ny . wo ul d not rn~tcrialh · 
• 
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trust indentures do not appeur to han· included it. One can infer from 
this that the drafters did not .. intend .. to c:-:tt: ncl protec tion frurn 
piecemeal liquidations. Th e existence of comrn ent m:· on the point in 
the I\.'lodel Indenture"" permits the public holders in tlw marketplace 
to be charged \\ith reason to b10\\ of this intent ion . 
But the commentary also permits a conflicting inference to be 
drawn. It notes th at in practice. the asset sale cm en a nt has been 
utilized onl-" rarely. ~u The claust:·s absence as plausibly cuuld slem 
from a m arket-\\·ide fa ilure to focus on the problcn1 as from a clc.•;ign 
to allo\v piecemeal liquidations. Gi\·en such a metrkd-\\ ick fa il ure. 
the successor obligor clause 's open-endl:'clnatt;re lean:s the court \\ ith 
discretion to decide the question either \\·a:·. Ancl a co urt _s.,':rantl·cl thi:·, 
discretion legitimately mi ght incline to \Yard impo:;i ns.,': on the issuu the 
burden of drafting a pro, ·ision explicitly sanctionin g i\11 act i()n (such as 
a piecemeal lic:tuidation) so clestructi\'E" of tht: holders' hcnga in 
Thus, the contextual evidence respecting the mean ing of the 
Sharon Steel successor obligor clause gives conflic ti ng signals. Such a 
cloudy contextual picture m a kes it difficult to justify a given interpre-
tation on the ground that it more likely protect::; t he parti es" expecta-
tions.60 The judicial decision, accordingly, begins tu beconw a matter 
of allocating the drafting burden , and the judge begins to displace the 
parties as law-giver in the relationship. Dr<.i ft ing burdens , ·d;ether 
im unspr1 <=or r -,·:tsorl" "r" "'f'c1·c·1·e·-1"'·· " r fairn "'~c; :~··i•rl ' 1 "t rr· ··· .-··:·;-,-, " :,.1.1 -... .l - -' '-" .ll. t_ - ~ - ~ \.) V .-. J. \...,. ./ \.j- _ ~ ~ t .1 ....-~·.._ ~ ~~ A • - •- ~ - .o l.,. } ll , _, -< • _. _. <1 ·' ~ 
Do-sec1 00 -l' he ·p·-·r~l·es rnl11 P ::::e('QT'lQ
1 ,~ ,i~ r· ;: it '<: "••p r ·r'J ·-• .~P ·• i r. ·'Lt·,-n; ·t-t'• ;..:lf;(Yf ' l'f .:.. .o~o ... _ _._ a.,.L . ~ 1 _, u ... \. _J • .l.'-~ - -·~-· Ju_ .. t u ....... ~ ~ .1 ~ -..!-:- _ ___ , ,_JJ • • -' · 
·c' hc. '-Ur>r>e.;:~or oblio·ur ,·.1ai JSP in Sha,·o n Ste.o! ~~~i :d ] its <:·on::; r ~ :cnt; \iti S '-' '-' """"" v'-' - b - '- ... - . . - _.. ,_ . . "' I - • ~ . ,_ . f ~ -'- • . 
cognizaD.ce o:f tl1e _parties' bttsir:te.ss e~<l_-~ect c'lt io r t:;_. ~ -; ,;Li' t r;· ; :~~ .._ ;·(·:fiec t - ' 
dens in deb:: t:cansact iun .. '· . 
8. . -!--_: il( li '(/ _/) ;·;· :,~· !" .\l{)l f·. 
Contract ci ra fter:) r)(·casion all >· c.ft:.~~1;.?Jl l)fU\'l:; i \)t._t:·, tt) c._} \"t_'l" " ,;;\ , ;~1(_' 
concre te situatio n. Ju dicial contr~-t (_-·t_i un or expdn:<(HJ ,,f such [/ f (_l·\ -;_'-..i t ;i!:< 
~s neither cor!.ternpl {_::tt:::i ·th·-,j. in\·lt.::d. ~~-.J l clt_·lri_ \_-l l t t ~ - ~~(~t~- c·(~n;:i;:~ <! l (: h 
S& Id . 2.t 42:3. 
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pro'.·i sions. Som e. such as payment. repayment and redemption p rO\·i-
sions, regulate the course of the transaction . O thers, such as business 
cm·enants. regu late th e course of th e issuer's business.h 1 
\\' ben these h igh l;: techn ical provisions give rise to interp retive 
disputes . classical and neoclassical values can come into sharp co n-
flict. For example, an event might occur which, under a literal read-
ing, falls within the scope of the provision. But consideration of 
contextual evidence might demonstrate that the same event probably 
lies outsi de of the discrete class of events contemplated by the drafter 
and, if included in the class , w ould probably frustrat e exp ectations. 
H ere , classical values point to the literal meaning \vhile neoclassical 
rderence to context counsels a narro\ver reading. In contrast, an event 
might occur \\'hich, under a literal readin g, lies outside the scop e of 
~h e prnvis 'on. But contextual evidence could indicate that including 
the eH:nt \\ ithin the SC() pe of the provision probahly \'-·ill protect 
:;:,:pectatiom. :-\gain, classical and neocl assic al Yalues point in different 
direction~: . Things get more cornplicated sti ll if nothing in the lan-
guage or circurr.stances clearly indicates w hether the drafter contem-
, . l - J ' 1 f . pH tee! a c osecl- or open- enc.ccl c"ass o transactiOns or eYents. 
[-[orr is c. L.-'nion Elecr ric Co. "2 concerned <!. provision i 11 the sup-
pleme rJ Ui.l indenture go'> e r:;:1ing an issue of bonds. The proYision p ro-
hi bited any re cl (~ "frt _p n ef f[_:ctuatec1 \\'it l-t the }J roceecls of a clebt issue 
{J(: :.·!_ r in.'}: :_ t J c;\ \ " <··~· C·C) tq_) !. Hl r~t t~~\ Ol" r;referrec1 stock havi:ng 8 }(Y\'·.' t' r di\'i-
cj;:_\ ·r; :~- ~- ~ -:~·erd: ·t" :·:t('. th aTJ t11: .. lt c,f th e isstle goYern ed t~y tl1e in,Je~nture . 
_-\ r ·-::;_ r!_·nt~·t '-.'(~C~-:l in the 1)~ (_ ) .. ·, -- }:--;~z-n ~ .::·:~--:ce p t:c·c1 red.trn_ptions frorr:: ;J ·· rna i!.1 -
_.:_ ~ -~~)·:· -, j~ ·-. _, -.1 ·-~·i ... ll i : ; !jt_:r:t~ltr c· :~ ,,. ~1 c l \':.. '~t) it1te11ded to force a lYartial rec1e tT1IJ-
:~ ~ O ll :-._ . 1_ h : ~ -?..\~t_- ::, ; ·_:t: !~ h{_\ lS >;~_ l c r had f ~_-dL.:. cl to c1c;;ote fifte t:•rJ. per·~' ~'11 t nf an.y 
+t ··~~ c:.:-' r l ior ~ll r'H)l•.:~nl i-~nt :-:+ 1 j-rlc1 e-rr:---11rp" lin;_ \ , ~ ~ ,_ :_.t -'---- · ~- · ' .t.;_:-_ ·l\~ ''·'- - ~ -J.- ~ .._ . _...i. .l_ . .._. ,J..L I 
n·ic~ne\· r:or tl1e occas ion for us~=' of th e 
~ ·, I_ 
·. ~ . ' ' · 
• = • · ~ •. l . • : · ~ :_! .: , · ,-_ 1 • l • ·, l r : ; ·. 1 , :•. · ;, : , 
·..::i - - - ~ ·· .' • :,•.. :\~·: ·. : ': ~~i ; . 
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tion prohibition (along with a redemption prernium also p ro\ ickd r 
in the supplemental indenture). 
A literal reading of the indentures supported the issuer's right of 
redemption. But all conte'.:tu a l edclence. including tl1e :;ubjectin: t: n-
derstanding of officers of the issuer. pointed to the uppo:-;itc result --
that the bonds had redemption protection. A --.ditch" proha \ l~i\ 
behind this mess: the drafter failed to rnark up and ~;plice togetl1t>r the 
constituent forms so as successfulh· to manifest the deal contemplatt-d 
by the parties. 0 h 
Harris does not imoln' facial!\ · \ague or ambiguous langu a ~'JJ . 
The Harris de bt contract is clear \\·h en read \Yithin its four corners. 
The interpretation problern becomes a pparent only when the conte:~t 
is consiclered. 1' 7 The choice beh\·een classical and neoclassical alternci-
tives could not be more clear. Strict classicism permits the court to 
remove the discordant contextual clem cnh fr om its fi eld of \ i.,.i rm. 
0:eoclassicism permits it to intt'nene in the rcl~1tiun.ship. in t'Hcct lc1 
created in th e !-fa r ris indc J'. t un·, the _;.;o -c ;;:t ll eci ··lrn p r,-:>. ·crnent i'u nd. · This F1;:1d \ '.:tt\ 
rhe rcfilnc-l:n ~ li 1nit at ion i r: t he :' .'<"i:i-T p< l l · c· ·n: l ;:~· ~i cd a:< the r n <-IirH t 'i J ~ ~ : i ~_· ,_· f;t 
interprc ~ ~d l pa rb of th e ~-k~C il nJ t·nt s 
i .' ~\ r~~·(·t a ti,-)n ~ {_•f td1 ;' :;. :·fi e· 
Tht_' c \:i<L"L e n! (_·ntitHJt:d _., 
:t_· i : 
a. rOSt.'" i nJoh~ I- Ia:lcr:,ck ~'viut . i ~ife. ln i.J. Co . \ ' c ~_t r ul ! ~ ! (< l:. -_ _, ·,~- t-" Y :).~ . 2d ;>~: .. ; !~:-~.:! C> 
1983'} {d isc;.tssed inr-ra n c::~.:: hS). c h i.-~ -~\ri.:i: .· l ,_ ; ·..: ~-' :! d:- ... _)~·~· cc-r ~ z ;-!~ i ·~ ~ ; , 
(albei t 1.vithout :~t tcCt':--\S ). ~ .. ·1·1 F.:=d c.t f;~ l . 
pLtted ruort .:'=><~'- · :_~ c: r 
·Jblig at i O i.1~ snC r_h:: 
different i ns tn u1 : :.:: n. t :~ . Uo{ rr.:.: ::: ting on a ~-n c r~-: 
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re\'> r ite the con tract to accord \\·it h the context. The Har ris court 
cho~e lhe cl assical altcmati \ e .'·'· It found the lan gu age "un ambiguous 
Oil its r a e <~ ... a n d p ermitted th e force of t he ··unamb iguous" b n guage 
tu ouh,·c igh the con textual C\·ide nce. '' ;' 
C. Cases I nterpreting Pro cisions Unclear in Sco pe 
T here foll ows a com parati\'e d iscussion of four cases. each of 
\\·hich concerns a vaguely designed p ro\·ision suscep tible to both 
ci osecl - and open-ended interpreta tion . i\s the cases shm\·, such \ ·ague-
ness m akes the meaning of such provisions highly sensitive to contex-
tual influence . The discussion cl oses by returning to the Second C ir-
cui t's Sharon Steel opinion to exa mine its treatment of a second , more 
,-1 i ffl·c·tJ l t- ; r- r' "''I' l'"'tat-i " I1 c•t•P.;; t·t' on ...._ t _: ... l l_ i _ t . C" .l _) v '- ~'J l _1 ... ............. l • 
Zcill?r u, Vlo rk \ :Vear C() rp. 7 0 c:oncerned a disp ute that arose 
\\h en <'tn issuer of debentures \\ cl S req uired to di vest a b lock of assets 
·\ /". As d i·J tht· :) ec0IHJ C: in: tiit \~: h t' ll a sl 1; hd :; d i! fc re nt ,·c rsinn r1f the san1t> CJ lH:_·~ t i on carne u p in 
_r\~~ ~n H;-t [ci':nr·k \ 1ut . Life Tns. C~o . \. Ca r nl i n~i P t)\:-" ::· r & L i·;h t C>; . 717 F .2cl G6--! (:2d C: ir. 1 0~:3 ) 
c:ar(/ iinn Po u·r'l COfl (' t' rneJ pri': a lL·l y pL1 ced hnncl :-: . A·; in } {ar r i.>:. the utilit y r edcenH~cl 
u l<' l nrH.:!:- \': ith r :.lS h dt.·pn.-; itcd in :i ·· Jna int t·nc: nc;_: ft: nd. ·· ~. i1 creh y c·i rcu tn \ · cntin _~~ a rl' fu ndi n ~ 
1 J!;·_ ~.:tr i oz-1 . Bur r- he i_c:,qe nf ! c L" : - ~r: l't:.l t i c•r: \\ - ~L"i '=li;__:: h t\y d iffe ren t. In Ca roli1;r1 J>ou:er. th l' reFund-
~;-., : >:t:i~ ·:lL: ; n ~~ r-· p ii t:J u ni~' ro -- ~~~ · r~ c r.-t~ :r:·rlt' rt:J_tf::i·· .. pr\·n· id~·d ftl f i n one· p a ra~r a ph of L!v_· 
'· ;\·~: c!·,i ! ~ !..! ·,Jtp:)~ · rnt_:n~_Lll i rtch· :·i t un.:: 1 n;!i :ltt:'f~ < i tL :· · L: nd r~:d <· t- ! 1 ~ ) ti u 1 !S '.\·ere ·· ~pecia l rcde in pt ions .. 
' 1 ~, -.. :d ,,(; f-n- i :~ ~l '\ f·· r ;t ri tt" ·. ' -~ ~a r : -i :< ~" < - tlh nf th:· :~: tc ; t ·: -;:_l J.i"i.: . ~< t ; p la:_h ible n .. ·ud i n _~ ::Jf t·he L.:1 n~ua~c 
iOlL·: ~~~ \\ " t ' ~ -~r ~ ~lf .~.Zh t ·· ·-- · j._-.:·j;_;, : r~ . I ! · =· " '. \ j .~i -- i :·· r_ ij:_• • :~__-.,1 1'! ; :~- ~ l w rc fund int.J: l il!li t::tt ion . 'fhc 
~: - 1 : ;c ; h :- ~d c r:. ~.-q_ ·v ~t d iffe r(:• !;'_ tack . '!n i n~~ r ll ~ L :_· ~ ;n : \·i .~:t~~t"::.; ·..::u \ -~ ' :- ~·;i :H! J_h t• lr~ ~ i :nh~ runct• fun d and 
·,:.· -~i : P.~ tl~,·t ·. ::h~_-<-;e ... ~ ; ,! r.nt t-'!" u 1:ifk· f:tr c:;t.--::·! :·._= -~t:·t-~i~ -~ :. inr::-\ 1 ; ~ n:~ ~"Jc- t· i t",F ~-t:;.ti"~ dur iiJL '-\·h ic:h pTE"Jpt> r ty 
·-- ! : •.~ ;_ , __ · ~: .._ .: ·~:JH !i~u~·t·..,· ~·~~·- ; ~-:. l ~:.::d -. -~r t :·-:r;h ··:t:·d .11 : :d;i ·~~ : :itLi ! l ~-i f t t: ·:n ,,r·rcc r:t ()f ~ ro~s n·\ ·enut'S . 
: ,li.' C!1ci i n i_ : n :_,_; ~ r_'i _ fu1 ;d r~_,q :. t ir:_,n,vn~ . L;n i t:. :'-..': its --, .= ll:·c t inn ·· tu i_hc chni c:c n f l; ;_!r t i(· nl a r 
:·. :- t (l b:.: :.: 1.~•pj}c·d ~n r:·:c n-: ~li;:tt·n n n :.:·~-· i': :nd ;n (·a,-.;1:· 11! ar: t:xce ::-: . id. a t b i j ~ -- G:~ (en1ph ~l s i s in 
,.,_ .. ~..:c: II;i."!:·~~c ) ~; J. !-10. t :-; the f;")nd ():' :-1 ::ti.l :_;,~ _:l.J rn a inter: <.~ ~1 ce e\ iJt'ncliturc.-;. Id . a t d68- S7. 
c ~~ e ~;·:7CG n c. ~ ~::t r •.;u. : t ck:c.id :..:·c.i fur the i.-> ~~ ; t ~·: ~.· i ~!n _c: th ~-~ ·' pL~ i ~l l a ngua .~e .. of the d ispuh:::d clause . id. 
TLv <.:<.~:--.!_· '. •: :_:,:-" :;r.·: ~lS ':_·!~: ;_~r =~·ut ~! .~ !:~:\"' S t:r_·(:;-~d c.:i :c ~ ti l i r~dic.-d•:d . ' i 'h~: ('IY ir t "s ~-~·a cli r:S!; ~ l..ifd ~ ­
··.-:<:Ji.:"(.·tf:,J t:1 -::· hi Lg:l<-<1..~'-.. . hi~: l·:J r:. · and pti r pt>~!· c! ~- th e specia l reci ·:: !np ti n n p rn .. · i :~in! : 2. t : s~ u r . £->.- en 
-~~~ - ~~ ~:v :-. ~ ::g u ;..: .i£t.' by r ~ u PJe a-~15 co : rq~· ·.: ll r::d d:,-, r ! ~·.; : Jlt. F:..:r ther n10:-e . n ·.s pcct Cor the purposf• and 
· i_s~_o : · :.- ~-~t t:lu.' r::fu r:di n.l..! ~ ir: ·! i t ~t i on ~, c i_ n~.s a rt-.' ~· 1 dt in tht· h(;n dhnld:.:·rs· Lt ':o r. T he co urt"s 
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pursuant to an antitrust consent decree. The issuer 21ccornnlished the 
divestiture by spinning off to its shareholders the stock of a rw'.vly 
created subsidiary to which the assets had been transferred. A deben-
tureholder claimed that the divestiture came within a standard trust 
indenture provision creating an event of default in case: " [Tlw issuer] 
shall ... be adj udicated a bankrupt or a court ... shall enter an 
order ... approving a petition filed against it seeking reorganization 
.. . under the Federal bankruptcy laws or any other ... statute of 
the United States ... or any State .... ''71 
Under a literal reading, the provision picked up an antitrust 
divestiture as a ''reorganization ... under [a] . . statute the 
United States .. , But, of course, "reorganization .. also ce:m be gi\·en a 
more closed-ended reading as a category limited to insoh·enc,· reor-
ganization proceedings. 
Interpretive rules of preference favor the narr rF. readino;::. as did 
the Zeiler court. 72 The ejusdem gcneris 71 ma··:im , .,_ , ; ~ : . its b ias ag2inst 
broad readings, comes to bear. Further, the n a:rm\· reading better 
suits the structure of the standard trust indenture . The standard Form 
explicitly cm·ers asset dispositions in its business cr,\ cncmt:; r at her than 
in default provisions, such as that at issue in Ze iJ, r. ~; And . as shcm·n 
by the fore going discussion of the successor ohli~or :~·lam e . 
covenants tend to treat asset dispositions flc~xibl1., d \ 
per se treatment this default clause applies l o .. 
rio 8!1\ ' F·.•c·'s ·indi(<<"P tl"it "hP l18l'''()\'.'f'1' rc·o··1ir,cr ·-• , ~- ,.:t t.. ___ _.. ____ ~ :....~ t._ __ . _ .1 1 I.. - L _  '--' •• . . J ~- . "" _.._ • . (. ._ \...-t._~;. 1 .":;'
the clebentureholc\er:;' e:\pectatiom.;s \"'Ve 
"' Icl. at i\9..! 
" Id. at 896 r-·.:;\·'"n if . . the ic,ten t of the 
Cou:ct ·,vould still be nbli .~ed to lin1jt thi:-: -~ :\ [)U"i"1'-;i\· e 
language \\'hich it"). 
73 Or " of the san1c ki:Jd": tha-t i:~: prrn·i.;inrL-.; shc:u.ld he 
specifically n1entioned. See E . Fa~n:s--.\·orth. supr.:t noteS. 
note 2 7. ;~ .5EJ:2. 
~~JE· ~~c ifcr (__'()Urt iHJt,~·(l t!li.-; r:.l C ( aS \\ '(_·i\ ~:r: c_l : 11JC 
ABF Corn!n~ntarie.s. :;upra nott• l, at ~O.:S ( .. a court c·ouid hold tlt<.J.t 
not a 
sorr 
~'·J o r 
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'>\ hich ali conte:,tua1 evidence_ internal and externaL points to the 
same clarifying limitation. No classical/neoclassical conflict occurs. 
Prescott, Ball ;i__- Turben u. L T\' Corp. 70 also invoh·ed the mean-
ing of .. reorganization'' in respect of the spin-off of the stock of a 
subsidiary. but .. reorganization .. as used in a different standard inden-
ture pnl\·i.~ion. The question \\·as \Vhether the holders of an issue of 
con\ erti b le Stlbordinatecl debentures had a right to convert into the 
spun-uH stock. The holders claimed com·ersion rights under the fol-
Jc;\\·ing pr<J\ision: 
In case of am· capital reorganization ... each D ebenture shall 
he com ertible into the kind and amount of shares of stock en 
other ;ecurities or property ... to \\·hich the holder of the number 
shares of Common Stock deliq~rable (immediately prior to the 
time nf such capital reorganization ... ) upon conversion of su c h 
Debenture \\ oulcl han~ been eEtitlcd upon such capital reorganiza-
tion 
hoJck-:.c.: ~'.r.c:ucd f(!r an open-ended interpretation: '·reorganizct-
t l<Jn a:: incl ing any "resh uffling" of capital structure. 78 The issuer 
.>t e1 narro'' er meaning lin1iting "'reorganizations" to recapital-
i;'~t li ·J :!'i i m r)h·im~ th e cv.: h:::HHZe o f one form of participation in the 
!s .< i _~(:r fur ~ -~ rtc·.~ther. ·.-
.> z . ; r: 
i.! '· I 
IL 
; . ~ ;__ 
'-, ' : J' ' ·. i!\ "-'.i. 
t 1·te Tl.1le f a\·c1ri 11g i.i·l tcr}Jrt-·tatic)rts IJ ron-l ()ti 1-1g 
rnent. The tru st inc1ent!_Jre's notice 
reur;!artizat inr~ .~~. r·r-ler-
thE· :<J.Jin-rJff \ 1.·a~ :! 
t)r t~)clLldC(l rr :~ 
l)rn\·isiot: 1-r1orc cle;.lr1~ c1e.";i _~~J1(· c{ t c_) 
here in the stanc1ard trust 
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on the va lu e of their com·ersion pri\ ilege , the~· had some '" reason to 
knO\\_,. of their exposure. This makes neoc:lassic:aJ protection of their 
contrary expectations difficult to justify. Here again, neoclassical and 
classical analyses point to the same, comparativeh- certain result. 
Buchman u. American Foam Rubber Corp. 82 im·oh·ed yet an-
other vague corporate term- '"di\·i dend."' In this case, both the stock 
and debt of the issuer \\'ere closely held, the debtholder being the 
infant child of a member of the stockholder group. The question \vas 
whether a member of the O\\·nersbip group recei\·ing se\·erance pa\· in 
connection w ith his simultaneous res ignati on and sale of stock to other 
members of the group rec:ein~d a '"cl iYidencl'" within the meaning of a 
debt contract prohibition. The court ga\ e the term a narrow readin g . 
To be a ''dividend,"' it held. the payn1ent had to be declared b\- the 
board and paid pro rata to all stockholders . Under a more open-ended 
reading, ·'d ividend'' could include any payment made by the corpora-
tion in respect of O\\'nership of common stock. The court rejected this 
reading , citing the understanding of the an:: rage businessnHm. S:l 
T h e court's intuition regarding business understanding may have 
been ill founded. It is not immediately appa rent that business p ersons 
would form expectations about the meanin g of "dividend" based on 
corporate lav/ concepts rather than on economic concepts . T he under-
standing of the avemge business lawyer or judge may be another 
matter entirely. Even so, no serious neoclassical challenge can be 
brought against Buchman's result. T he limited n umber of parties 
invol·vec1 make ir1fere~'lces Tegarcling sttlJjective i_ntent an Hl)prOJJriate 
basis for decision>'~ _Intent tha t: 'dL·idend" be c·•_>nstruE:d narro\;;.'ly can 
be ir1fe:rrec1 -frorc. th-e O"'·.\·nershir~ gro u _p~ :~ ;_~cqujescence at the tin1e of the 
transactio.n ancl for y~.::nr~ t l1erea fter. 3:) 
Bdt a fuc tu c1J. , .:J.r i~·tLltJn on _l3uch :no n can be h\-1J( 'd-he.~i~~.ecl \vh.ich . ' -- . -
·\\--()Ldci terrrpt a nec}c!Li~<::[c· t•) att.::H:h a different rneani ng tu the san1c· 
} angua .~~e . ,~~ll ~hat .is :1~cdeci is U} rn a .ke tl1e c1 cbt p u 1)l icl:: h,?lc1 anci 
6
" Th e: cr:::cji~o r s · :·i~h t.'i \1-" i.:tt' 
d t h:3. 
. Td. 
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traded. 't\o',\' , 110 suhiective element or \\ ·ai\·er provides a bas is for 
choosing beh\·een the competing broad and narrow m eanings. A court 
vdmlcl ha\·e to look else\vhere in the context for clarif:-·ing circum-
stances . Thus, contex tu al variations affect the clarity of th e language. 
Broad v . Rockwell International Corp. 86 presents a real interpre-
tive conflict as sharp as that just hypothesized in respect of Buchman. 
The case arose w hen an issuer of convertible debentures was t aken 
over by means of a successful cash tender offer and subsequent cash-
out of the issuer's remaining m inority shareholders. T h e issuer and 
acquiror took the position that upon the merger's consummation, the 
holders could convert only into the amount of cash they would have 
received had they converted their debentures into common stock of 
the issuer immediately before the merger. The indenture trustee and 
the debentureholders took the position that the conversion rights car-
ried over after the merger to the common stock of the acquiror. 
The issu e before the Broad court was \\ ·hether cash consideration 
was "other property" \\·ithin th e m eaning of an anticlilution clause in 
the indenture . pro\·iding that the holders· com·ersion rights be trans-
ferred to the "stock. securities or otl1er property" recein·d in the 
merger hy the issuer's common stockholders . If ·'other property" in-
cluded cash. then the prO\·i.c;ion froze the \·,due of the com·ersion ri~hts 
at the amoun t of the cash consideration. 
The issue r had a strong case. A literal reaclin .~ of th e contested 
proYision fa'.·cm~ cl it: -- cash" falls \\· ithin a :-;t andarcl definition of 
··propertY.-- And the Broad court \\· as noth ing if not literal. '~ A court's 
duty. it \\rOtC'. is to "gi\ e the \\ orcls and phrase:; ernplo_\ eel in t he 
contrac t their plain me<:min~ . -- ~" 
A. con te.\ tu al argument also \\ ·as a\ <:.i la ble tn the issuer. Sh11Ebr c! 
<:mticlilution provisions tend to han an open-ended design. Thus. the 
issuer's open-enclt·d read ing. S\\Tepim; in a ll conct'i\·ahk corpor::tte 
combinations . \\ '=lS consistent \Yith the O\·erall sch t· me . 
A strong con textual argument also can be:· advanced o n bel1alf cf 
.Lh l ' 'l ' . ' > t. T' t . l 1 t t I . . ' l .e nower s mcerpreta wn. he s ancaro con,rac C1anse a1: Issue a.l1F> 
dated st at u to ry p rov1s10ns perm itting cash-out mergers . S(l T he cash-
----·---- -----------
, . 6·l2 F.:2cl HC:!J (.')th Cir. !L' II ban e) . cvrt. clcnied. - ~'l-~ L' .S. ~Jb ~ : JD,\1 ; 
.'< See ~ d . at 9--!-k--.51 . ThL~ ccurf~ step-by -s tep approach nia y ht• sct·n a:-; fo rti t udir~!i ll S o; h~t n1-
han(h:'d . depend in~ nn c:n(:: _~ p(1 int of '.·iev-.·. 
3 ~~ At the time th e Br(1ad t rust jnd~n tu rl:' \\' 2.:-i ext·cuted. the corpo ra tt' L..t'.\' of th:::· issue r· s stL.d:c 
of inco :·poration did no t perrnit c 2.:~h ont nit i:I ~r:-l . ld. at f!.5l : -~cc Bratton. :;u pru nc~t' 1:2 . 
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out merger therefore could be characterized as a "new development" 
outside the universe of possible transactions contemplated by the pro-
visions' drafters. This analysis leaves the provision open-ended, but 
not quite so open-ended as to encompass a development as radical as 
the cash-out merger without explicit amendm ent. The bondholders 
also could point to the standard antidilution provisions' purpose of 
protecting their investment in the conversion privilege and the mar-
kets' expectations that the standard language effectively achieves this 
purpose. 
Broad closely resembles Harris.fJo In both cases, classical consider-
ations point strongly toward one interpretation, while neoclassical 
contextual inquiry gives rise to a conflicting signal. And the Fifth 
Circuit's approach in Broad resembles that of the Harris court. The 
issuer wins in both cases due to the weight put on classical "plain 
meaning·· considerations. 
D. Good Faith 
\'Ve return to the Second Circuit's Sharon Steel opinion. But, 
having considered that case's interpretation of the standard successor 
obligor clause, we move on to its second phase, in \Yhich the court 
internrets standard redenmtion Drovisions. Here. the Second Circuit 
< " " 
ascribes a very open-ended rr.e ;1ning to a n apparently closed-ended 
provision by making good faith considerations override both contract 
language and the parties' probable expectations. This interpretation 
entails a degree of Jiuc1ici al intervention remarkable in the context of 
~· 
debt contracts. 
'T'h n / n ' ' l; . ; ' ' . 'b j • ' ·. • .. 1 
.1 t e 2; ,1aron otc r:?f ouncul o lcle rs~ t1av1ng es"t [L J. 1S11ec1 "Ch at tne 8.t -
tempted assumption constituted an event of default, took the position 
that the trust indenture's r edemption p rovision covered the issuer·s 
• ' 1 . • ' . A I' th d t1 . J l r:necemea1 nqmdat10n. S a f 2 SU .T, . ey a rgue , ne lSSUer 0\V8C1 t .nern 
a redemption premium in addition to principal and accrued interest. 8 1 
The issuer responded that it owed no premium because it had not 
exercised the redemption ~'rovi:~ions . The holders· claim to principal 
~ • {' 'I r ' } r [ • ) • 1 1 
and Interest arose rlot rrOD1 :red errl _p -r.Iort, ~Jut 1rorn tne1r Oi:'.'!l. CiCCla ·~~ a-
·~·· 1c·)ns l·Jf Q1Pt'oul·t 8n(l f'Q· '-t''C• 'J~tll· ;. . · l ,-, .,L' ')('(' o.ipr~-lt'l'r;q Q C rh"' de lo~,· ",; .,112. l-q •1' ·i··h· cl ~ 
• .!.. .1. -_...LC. :. .... ~ ! . -.......;. ~ •. !:. .~o. J t..-:. ~ -- ~_.. .J.._.._ • .• '\.... .i_ .l- l V ..- '-' l .• \. •_ , .... • , 
Nu See supra t ext accornpa;1 y ing nctc.s 6~-GD . 
91 Sharon Steel Corp.': . Chase :-...-1anhattan B3n k. ~\ .A .. 5:2i F . Supp . ll .S . 12·j- ( 5 . 1) .>~- . Y. 
1931), rev'd, 6\-J l .F .2d 1039 (2ci Cir. l~Jr; s·). Cf:> r t . denied, 10:3 ~; . Ct. 12:3.3 ( 188:3·~-
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The district court agreed with the issuer.~n It invoked t he rule of 
preference under which specific provisions- h ere the d efault provi-
sions-prevail over general provisions--here the redemption provi-
sions 9 4 T he Second C ircuit rc \·ersed, relying on a purpose interpreta-
ti on . The purpose of the red empti on pro\·is ions \\·as to .. put a price 
upon the \·oluntary satisfaction of a debt before th e dak of matur-
ity. --nr, The iss uer's actions fell wi thin this purpose. a mounting to .. a 
voluntary liquidation which inclu ded plans for paYm ent an d satisfac-
ti on of th e p ubl ic debt. " Hh In effecL the holders requested---and got -
specific performance of t lw redemption pro\·ision. 
This purpose interpreta tion runs counter to th e standard de bt 
contract's language , structure and purpose. F irst. the interpretation 's 
characterization of the redemption pro\·isions · p urpose is o\·erly 
broad . The provisions grant t he issuer a righ t in the nature of an 
option. The issuer exerc ises this option \'-:h en do ing so ach·a nces its 
interests .'!' T hus, \\·hi le ' 'n1luntary ," the pro\·isions ."er-,·t· a m uch nar-
ro\ver purpose than the Second Circuit in d icat es. Secuncl. t~w inter-
pre ta tio n relies on incorrec t assumption.s about the technical operation 
of the pro \·isions. They com e into ph:~ o n ly \\·lwn tlw issuer foilO\\'S 
certai n r·rocedures: \·oluntary liql lictati cH1:' clo not nf t lwmseh·f:''· act\-
\·ate them . Th e procedures \\'Cre not fo ll(W:t•d in Slwron Steel. !' ' 
Th u':. \\'hil e a liq ui da ti ng l'~sner is Free to csercisc it:: option to 
d ecla re a redemptio n , noth i n\~ in th:, sta nclitr cl trust ind enture rc:q t:i n ·:-; 
it to do scL Its failurr-~ to cln so d(;(<:.: n o t~ lea \·c t h ~-' holcler:) Y\·ithnut ~t 
riglt t tc) d e clare the (:' lltirc pr j ncip~d ~~.rnn :~n t cd· tl: c c{c bt c.n1cl accr tl!.:'c1 
interest d ue ct nd l)Hyable . ·1'hc li qn i-=latlt -l_~~ i :~ ~ ~u ·r ::_' \ ·en t ua ll:. \\·ill tlc --
Fa~dt on its cn\·en aT tt lo n·1aintain i t.~ ct)~· (;:_;r ~t'f: ( _' c\ i:-;tc ncc·. t~t 1 1 · ~ I Yt · : · L ·l~l- -
" Id. 
lJ n ~~.- ::'i un:, pr ~_·! tcc t ci: c· i;-;:-d ti_J: ·.1 \:\: IL··r , : ~. le:~ ·:int · i1; tt :t· C:() \L t 1r i! l ~ --'l tC' \' . r : 1r t· h·_ 
pri ;_ .. ,..__. oi f_ h:: i-Tt' !f!i urn . th t' i ~;s~_ l f:': · C" r-!.11 r(· Fu~:d th :_ · i.<<ti •.· ·,':h~: :•· _· ':•.-r ~~ ~- iJ t :L..: !L ~- . ·-:~- .-...t !if n :: I':t.". 
s ;; HecL='q· 1 pf ic' ~ en tc! ils s·.= tt i :-1.:~ a call cLlt e . :j .:: '~' .·\HF" \ :: :; £ 1 !:· :-: ~· tila r ~t~; . s t~p r;::. n : :· C <:.~ l . at -~,'-;} 
(sa n1ple pn)•:is~on S :~ - .2; . . \ o sc.ch -:·:.-dl d2t :e ·x c.::; : r: ::~h c:· ·)i! ~; l ee! . The d::L:t h Hcll) l·_':_··.' t !i '.:> 
due ar.d P'-;\·ab.te by \·irtu ~ of the hoi de;-s· 3. cti c ! ~s 0f ' lL''~- · :.:'!.:-n.;ti on r~;-~ir r:r th~n h\· ._- l:t:.te -:::i' the 
is~;u2 r ' .s ::::·~e :-c~se of ~~be r€den1ptit) P. op :io ·: . 
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ting the holders to accelera te . ~ '' Ultimate ly, dissolution mat ures all 
inde btedness by opera t ion of state la'.'. ' . llHl 
l\one of this denies the subterfuge and bad faith implicit in the 
Sharon Steel iss uer 's liquidation and repa\m e nt b~ default . But in the 
highly stylized\\ orl c! of the trust indenture, bad faith and subterfuge 
do not b ar the conclusion that default pro\·isi ons may be utilized to 
adYance the iss tH-r·s interests. I\or do t hey compel the Second C ircu it's 
conclusion that redemption pro\·isions w er e d esigned to regulate self-
interest ed beh a \·ior. 
In sum, the probabilities regarding marketplace expectations lie 
on the side of the iss u er 's interpretation of th e Sharon Steel redemp-
tion provisions. Nothing in the standard trust indenture gin~s the 
market reason to belie\ e th at issuers must pay premiums in respect of 
vo luntar > liqu idations. '-:or has p as t .iudicial tr eatment of debt con-
tracts given the market cause to hclie,·e that such a premium rnight be 
interpolated judi·:;ially. 
Ail of this makes Sharon St eel hard to defend, en:·n unde r neo-
cl assicd principl e.s. B'-· O\ e r!or;kii!g strung signa ls :;uggesting ali ,gn-
men t bct\'.·een m arketp lace expec tations and the iss u e r's interpreta-
ticnl. the deci sion effect i\ ely Frustrates r<q)(~Ctati0l1 S . c~~ ~es Like Brood 
a rc cl i s ti n ~~ui shahl e For_ in them. the p rob a bilit ies regarding market -
pl ace e:·:pectations <lre m Itch ]e.<:s clear and t he cl.m bi t of juciic- i;.d di.•;c rc-
· ~ ;,-n, c·nrr{>c--, r·.I• cii n uk n ·11lf'h \Yi cl •" · \.1 '-· - J ' -' - ~ - . ) l - _, l ,~ - •• J. i '· -- ~ .1. ..._ J • 
Bt 1t fu rth e r re Fl ect io n sh O\'. :.; that e\ en Shmnn ':l tccl nu\· li e 
\-... ·i thin th f> arn1)it oF ncocl assi c;_d Judtc i~:~d discretion . TI~ :\Cdli tl·tct t lan-
t..~~~ctge i') unclear by degr::'':\s. ~\<o:· L~n~ in ~ hr: :)l!ornu Sl er. ) t~~ t: s t _indel1-
t nr ~~· -~ >; t;J. tt·d "..Yith one huLdrl'd perc~t·n t clarity ~hr.t t i~ h e is .~l !lCr CJ\\· ecl no 
D i PriJ J l i J1"1 . J~Y t~· n t h~H F! h t he r>r ·. :ha 1)ili t ies r C~!(t rcl i fl .~ C ~\. p~ ··~. : ·t ~ t ti C.H1~ 
. , . · , t . ~ . . . 1 . , ·l 1 1 1 ·1 . 
p t~ _: ntt:c~ u .r··- . 1~ aru tn a t rrl; ~·rp~·t·r ::1 tton . tl1 lCl e\·cn tn l_'~li .~! l :-dJ.C' t~ pro.J~li )lll -
tic·:; tn ~d.:~- · tq! the· \\ ;:~·i .~ ht.i('.-... t -, - ( 1_r j ah1~~· in r:c-:-~ ·H_:i::l .': s i ca1 ~tnc:d\ ·.s i s . ot hc·r 
c'~· dl jjltcrpret;_:tl l) i1 ------ :_.i. \·ari<-.-l!) lt:- (. ~ \ · a i.l ~tblc to (}\ 'C'i'ricie ~~~\pc- ct c.( tii ) J";,;_; 11 '! the 
r :.trt:' c :-t\ t: . ::ll 'T}-,c S•~·cond C_::i l · c ~:it.. in effect . . \ elec!.t:-::_ l ':) /J ct"r~nt Stee ! ~ L, nne 
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of these rare cases . T he opinion refl ects the judgment that the issuer's 
bad faith course of conduct makes a result other than that chosen by 
the parties th e fairest result. 10 ~ 
E. Summary 
B.S. F. , Zeiler, LTV and Buchman are easy cases . In each, the 
literal reading and the contextual inquiry point to the sam e meaning. 
Both constituencies are satisfied. The classicist has respected the lan-
guage, and the neoclassicist can be confident that the in terpretation 
advances the parti es' expectations. 
When , as in these cases, the e\·idence sends a discernible signal 
that a giwn meaning in all probability protects the parties' expecta-
tions. interpretation becom es dou bly easy . By at tach in g that mean-
ing, the parties make the la\\' and the court comes as close as it can to 
inserting the prm erbial p rovision the parti es \\'Oulcl ha\·e inserted had 
they thought about the matter . This promotes efficiency. ! Ill and also 
soh·es the fairness problem by allO\ving the parti es to define the fair 
result fo r tbemseh ·es . 
Harris , Broad, the hypothetical variation on Buchman and both 
phases of Sharon Steel are more difficult. In each , the literal reading 
and the contextual inquiry point in different directions, creating clas-
sical /neoclassical conflicts. The vari ant sign als make the cases dou blv c • 
difficult for the neoclassicist. The probabilities regarding the part ies' 
expectations are less dear cut . forcing the neoclassicist to look to 
source:; other than the parties for la \v leading to efficient and fair 
results. In Broad and Harris the courts turn to classical principles . 
Slwron Steel suggests resort to neoclassical good faith principles and 
goes so [ :u as to give them determ inative \Veight. T he final section of 
this /uticle evaluates these alternative approaches to the d ifficult debt 
contract interpretation case . 
III . brr:tJWH.ETIVE NoRMS FOH DEBT CoNTP.ACTs 
The !3roud court re:;oh"ecl the interpretation question before it 
with the belp of two classical rules. First, contract provisions are 
1 " ~ E' Tn if this :-.tr ikt·_, th e rcad t· r a_-.; f~JIICY h11 t ho llr.l\'' rr~·<t.'i(Jnin~ :.;fl orin·~ t!p a ,., l'a k int t·rprl'ta-
tion C:.l\t' . thr. ' n :.<.: 1Jlt \t i!l: n i~h t lk · de fcJ J d~.·t-l ~~ s puniti\·t· dantd \ ..U:s rt·spilJH.I int! to t h e iss JJt·r \ \\· il ihd 
fJreach nf th1· cnnt:act . ()f C'Ot l r~f.· . tl 1 i~ assnciation nf a n ·d t·!npt iu n -·prl·nJil tl1 1 .. ,_, ·ith a ··pc·nalt~· .. 
Illi·~ht [ l\:_\~:L' 1! 1:111>" l:t\\ ·:·vrs tl!J('()]!l rortabl z· . Pract iti()llLT" rprc-.; ll! Jl '-l bl~ · ) .r • .:iu.: (lpini!lll\ tll at rt· -
d t•l1lj1tiiHl prt·P1il l l'l1~ ;_!rc l"'i!ft>rct·ahl f· ~~hli ·:! ~lti nn .'i hascd llrl t lw '-l th~1t th C' [ lrt·rn i utrl is a 
t·on!p•, · ; J s atf_q- ~ · l i<plidated d ;.Jilla .~t·~ pro, ·is inn a11d in :! f' \\·a: · i. \ " p· . ·nalt~ · -" 
]u . • {jr ~~ 11 Profl's~nr !IH1\\ ' J l :dL(t' i Pn~nl'r td ls us. Su· Pu:\11 l'r ,"x Ho.-.: t.'nf id cL fnq )tls.~.ibility an d 
1·\·l:.t;t ·d Dc :ctrin t·." i11 C1)ntrar..:t La-..\·: An Ec!J nunlic .-\_ il<d:~ -si.-.;. h J. Ll'.~:.tl St ud . ~·..;: ~. ~' · :.(< .. )-)~) 11~.177\ . 
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either ambiguous or unambiguous as a matter of la\\". Second, con-
flicts between competing meanings are resolved in favor of ·'plain 
meaning," absent some "compelling reason. " 104 
A neoclassicist would criticize both rules. The first rests on an 
overly simplified view of the world. Vagueness and ambiguity are not 
binary concepts; they arise by degree. The precise degree of ambiguity 
in a given case can be ascertained only by reference to context. The 
second rule amounts to a presumption against inferring meaning from 
context. Such a presumption unduly risks frustration of justified ex-
pectations. 
Ironically, both rules also can be defended on contextual 
grounds. The Broad opinion rnakes such a neoclassically inspired 
argument. It surveys the trust indenture's history and economic func-
tion , concluding that certain and consistent interpretation aids tbe 
bond market. 105 Since these classically biased rules promote certaint:· 
and consistency, they are the rules best suited to th e debt contract 
context. An evaluation of this position follo\\'s. 1111; 
A. Certain!!J and }~xpecta tions 
Legal certainty in corporate debtor-creditor re lationships does 
produce economic benefits . Uncertainty as to the parties' rights and 
duti es makes debt securities riskier and therefore less \·aluable. This 
uncertainty also makes the\ aluation process more cos tly. 
A three-pronged argument supports Broad's propos ition that clas-
sically inspired rules promote ce rtainty. F irst. classical rules res tri ct 
the scope of the int·2rp rctatiun incp1in·. This li mits t he range of inter-
pretations to \\·hich a gi\·cn cont ract is legal)~· susceptible . increasing 
the likelihood that t ransacting pa rties \\ill arri\·e at u common inter-
' '" Broad. (j..J.2 F.2d at 9-! il-.'5! . The cou rl curnes clGse to repeating th e hoa r\ cl assical rule that 
plain mea ning c:c,ntrols unl ess it '-Hillld lead to "absurdi t,·" or ··incomi.l lenc\· ... See Braucher. 
supra note :31', at l..J.. 
i l'.s Broad. ().--t2 F.2d at 9--H)- --1 6 . ~J --1:7 -- --10 t~ n .2U. Intercsh n.'Sly. sin1ilar con:-;c l t:> nti u u ~.; n es:; \\· as 
d ispla Yed b' the dis trict judge in K,.ih '. Cent ral HanO\L'i" Bank & Trust CP .. 1 J F. S11pp. -W7, 
.503-04 (S .D. ~ .Y. 1935) . re-.·d. S.'J F .'2d fi l (2d Cir. Ul3t1) (di<:c msed :ilt pra note 671. 
' 06 The p roposition to he e:wmined is nut entirely noYcl. Professor Sp·~ idcl has no ted tha t the 
twentieth centun· tendency tO\\ ~lrrls cuntex tualizinf( :.tandards nw\· h:i\' L· to be hl'ld in ch r:·ck in 
those contex ts requirin g more "guidance t.o. and control CJ\.l'f . both tht pa rti es and the cuur t"· 
than open -end ed neoclassical g1lidd incs pro\· ide. Speidel. suprct note 10. at 789- 9:2. Com pare 
also Professor FarnS\\·orth's ad n Jcac\· of an "'o bj ecti,.e .. apprnach to standard form con t racts as 
prorn oti\·e of consistency and certain t:-·. This "objecti\·e" approach entails not a " ·hoic:;ale 
reYersion to classicism, but unl\" th e t•xc: lus ion of t:\id ence as to particular parties· Sllbj ccli\·e 
intent. Other contextual e,·idence may be considered. E. Lunsworth. Sll pra note S. § i. 7. tit 
-c\91-92. 
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pretation. The neoclassical inquiry does the opposite b y increasing the 
range of possible legal interpretations. The second p hase of Sharon 
Steel aggra\·ates this neoclassical error by introducing an additional 
unnecessary interpretive variable~judicial punishment of selfish be-
havior. Second, t he narro\v classical inq uiry forces parties to draft 
clearly and thoroughly to protect their O\vn expectations . 10 ' \Vhil e this 
may entail additional transaction costs, the savings due to greater 
certainty very well may b e greater. 108 Finally, as the Broad court 
emphasized , classical rules keep the jury out of the picture . 109 Jury 
participation makes the interpretation process less certain. Classical 
rules apply as a " matter of law,., while neoclassical contextual inquir-
ies generate questions of fact for the jury. 
The classicist could add to this argum ent a rebuttal of the neo-
cl assical position that classical interpre tation frustra t es expectations. 
D ebt contracts a re well and thoroughly drafted. Their competent 
drafters contemplate the imposition of classical norms. Therefore, 
classical rul es will aclYance the parties' exp ectations in most cases . In 
addi t ion, the p arti es interes ted in debt cont rac ts tend to be sophisti-
cated investors. \\ ·hose expectations are unlikely to o u trun th e tex t 's 
plain m eaning. 
Acceptan ce of the abon· proposition that class icism prom otes 
certa int: completes onl;-· the first s tage of t!Jt:· inqu iry . \Vc· st ill m ust 
ascerta in the C:' \ pec ted \ ·alue of the certain tY ben efit. A fe\\ p r :.\ct ic ai 
obsen a tions show t h"t thi s \ al u E:' is prohab l: net \ T r\ ·:.; rcat . 
F ir:--; t. classic ,1lh· insnirecl n tles \\'ill n ot t)m d uce (:rmw letc c:·r-
- - : - - ! - l 
t ;-tinty . () niy 1Jerfec t d r aftin .~! can d o that ~ and perfc·c·t dr aft ing i:..; 
u nattai n e1 bl e . T h us . costl:: uncertain t\· •.;: ill p c rsi:;L e \· t· n t<mkr t he 
n1ost cl ass ical of rul e_~ ; . \ J or ~ ... · ~ .J '. ·e r , the cl airn that c l a~~:; i c ~J.l n n r n1:~ 1) t~sl 
encuur a2:e parties to come as c[, ,:-; e as p o:,sibl t· u, p t'lfe c!: druftl n'~ r i n ~s 
ct b·it bol1 tr\ \' in the debt corif· rH.c_~ t cnnt.~· x t. L.a.r_'_:: t: rr~ln.\ act i ~ .~ n .s \\ ·i t h 
-;c ph is ti cated p crrties pro-,·i d c ~ cuoom ic: in ccnti\ cs tU \ \ ;_tt" cl pt:r h:·ct 
r~ 1 ·: _) f" 1.' -i ,. ·) tr ]· ,.., '-l rl \. F-1\ '{-"n !· '"f l1{:' r f ~i! ] -1- ip o Y (;(1(_' 1!1 -' ) f-' n t ·- · \\'ll ilt' ; , -qi -l' ' l' r ~-~- ,t-.__,~. •- 0: \. .. J..! ·':""! _l , (. • _.. ~ ~- •• , _. • , • l ~ .i .-:--- ' . ~ . ; _ .. - _, \ • , .o. •• l l • ; , \... • .......- "- L • 
ccr ta in l\· ten d t c.~ l·i (; e~b::lu sti \· e . In \uch a co rrtt·\ t . th~.·- c1 c:.-.ih: t: r · ~-; ;:{\ ·e r -
Jrit'c,_ns of _iHd C' CUr <:l tC: nnt io ns oF t}·tc: b:1S il1ess c uLit ... }.~t ;;r -~J:uod fc~ i t h 
n~.:)r :.:t.l.i J: i n~2: ) cuuld pru\·t_· a st ronger in c~r, ti \ ·t· tn clt:~u·. th n r:.J :lgh c1 r ~ift ­
j ni_~ ~h nn ::·~ ~;:-~ r~j nn tc· t he rrn.J S P (~ C: t of cL.1 :~s i c a J l l l ci ;.d .t_-;t c· r c~ . li srn . 
:-~: .· ;_ · i rd_. ! · :..~ !t .-;: e.'; i .1.!} . ~ ~ i.I: u ~ t\ ' C't>rn:) ~ n ~ ·i :·:.'2 : t ·\ ; . 
·''~ (; .1;2 .F ·2d :.lt ::1.1 ~- .j}; l'.: n . ~~l. 
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lt also must be noted that classical rules do not afford certa in 
knowledge that courts \\ ·ill attach standard usage meanings in all 
cases. Judges circurnvented the strictures of the rules eYE:n in classi-
cism's palmy days. 1111 The Broad rule builds in such circurm ention by 
permitting unspecified "compelling r easons" to overcome plain mean-
ing. This leaves the judge free to attach a contextual meaning in the 
first hard case that comes along. 
Conversely, the increment of uncertainty resulting from an unre-
stricted neoclassical approach probably '.vould be trivial in magni-
tude. Good drafting is the reason once again. Standard form debt 
contracts limit the room for neoclassical maneuvering. And, as Zeiler, 
LTV and Buchman demonstrate, inquiry into all the circumstances 
often only serves to reinforce the liter al meaning. Of course , as Sharon 
Steel shows, neoclassica l moral impulses ca n prompt irnprobable read-
ings of technical provisions. But certainty in co rporate debtor-cred itor 
relationships is not seriously undermined en;n by this sort of decision. 
The relationships' fundament a ls, such as the debtor's pro:nise to pa;·, 
remain immune to such interpretive vagaries . And the sort of oppor-
tunistic behavior \vhich results in culpability becorn ing a d etermin c>,-
tive interpreti ve factor h as its O\vn d cstabihzin:£ effects . 
rr 1II C l Drob'lern )f in,-.on~ .. l ~· -1-en~ .;l~r ·l·fH~ )""err~ ,....,; .n,- "P 1 ·lt ~+ n ·n 1• : ·~ .... ~ r· ws -:T ... ,_ .,, " _ ·' ' " I_ .1:, ~ 1.> .. :"> 1 . . c J .• L - ~ ' , •-"< - ~.:> . -'-JL n • ..! . l.' Ll>l.' <~ L d 
Broad because th,,, court takes the nec.1classical \·iev: i: h at evidence of 
circurr1stances fr o rn outsiClc t ~be fuur cor ners of the d ocurnent trartS·· 
forrns iJ"lterlJretati o ~n c1 uest i c~ns tn·tn Ci ue.~;ti on.:; of fact. 1 t 1 T l1e Sccnr1d 
t-: ircuit's S.hn·ron ~St e.el nrd~-llcrn l :_ :~ takes 2.r.tother a. ppr~; et c11. Jt rn.al(f:-3 ~ll l 
ctH3sica1 aplTr :.) ;:t ct~~- ~ ~ -nd ht~- re, i.t l~J. t.'?./='- .1)- · s n:tvf~s t.he r.l eoclas:s lc·c-;.1 r_:un .sist -
eTJ. 1~\-: :prolJlerr1. i l J 
' . ~ tu ::t C~\ - Ltrt C e tt: i.:·' t: .\ 
. · ' !.' -~ - --~ F. ::.! :-: t :-: -• .. - ·:: ,';. . -· - l ; ·, -.. ~ \ l _, • ) . 
: '· ; i" :.... t : ~ i : ; ' t ..  . ( . } . : . : ! :_ ~ 
:-).~_: (l _ : nd C!!-C l i i~ :_.,_ ;_:[ ', ·: _,·tr.:;·: _ : ... ;_':.::_;·:_:-•. ·: ! ;, !; •Jn l ;: ·: :-:· ::. wi i_;-: p~·~:-., · , : ::; r :-~ ;;' \ j •l_: :·z '.\·i i ;x:·. :t ··- ·:-- ; ; , ~- 11 :; ;.:- -~; : t 
~ n ! -c ! ·pr ; · ·t:-.tL i( :·! --~ ;_, , _ _... :_; ._; r~ :, ~ ! i:·:- ( ;: ;::·_ .t 1,_ 1J\ . 
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ColD become misaligned e\·en \Yith respect to debt contracts. As in 
Brood. unforeseen financial devices can spring up outside the set of 
transactions contemplated hy the drafter. Or, as in Harris, the draft-
ing can contain defects unnoticed by the parties. Classicism risks 
frustration of expectations in such cases. Such occasional frustration of 
expectations produces its own transactional uncertainty. A more e\·en-
handecl analytical balance of linguistic integrity and context would 
permit courts to protect expectations in these cases , \\·bile promoting 
certainty by respecting the literal \Yord in the broad run of cases. 
Standard efficiency claims , too, may be ach·anced on behalf of 
the classica l approach, but these largely 0\·erlap the certainty claims. 
The argument is as follmn: The uncertainty attending neoclassical 
inquiry imposes risks. and thus costs, on the contracting parties . 111 To 
the extent that classicism an;icls this uncertainty cost. i 1" the costs of 
borrcm ing and lending rnoney decline. At the m<.u,gin. then. classicism 
facilitates \·aluc-enlwncing transactions which otherwise might he 
impossible . 
This theoretical argument might carry some weight if accompa-
nied by empirical evidence that neoclassicism in fact is more likely to 
lead the courts to results that are contrary to the parties' expectations. 
But even if that proof 'vvere made, the net inefficiencies probably 
would be minimal. Standard d ebt contracts can be redrafted cheaply 
tu avoid any judici al interp retation the marketplace dislikes. 11 '; Only 
those esisting contr:1cL' subject to such an aberrant interpretation 
sufFer lt.l.:.:;ting consec1uences. 117 
sum up . the certainty and efficiency ach-anta'-(es 
qu d:Jss ici>m met\· be more theoretical than real. Cnn 1 r<Hi\\·ise _ 
neoclassici.mi nla': prod uce less uncertainty and lts'O incHi-
B. Process Considerations 
, ., l ~ • I • , • 1 1 l ' - ' ~ l 
~.._,w~.slcai 1ntcrpretatwn \·ery \\.ell may )rmg more app1-ccwD,t' 
:,~, n2,: in tht.> cuu rthnuse th<:m in the marketplace. The narrm,·cr 
--- -------·- ----------- -- ----------·------
i: cf R. Posnt_·r, supra note 1D. at 16 ("Clearly . then. to the ri:-:;~: 
J \':_'r:; t· ri sk :3 cu.';t. and its elirn in~:.t i o r! <:: g'-l in."). 
il.'; Elsl."'\\ ·h;_"f::~ i Ti th i:~ Articl z: , 1 h:~\T argued that such t>Xtent is likely to be zer CJ . Set_· su pra nut:..::; 
~ u~l - l:3 ,_-tnd ;_\(_· cnrnpanying tc :d. 
t·· TLi~; fVJ]nt i:-' at in Bra t ton, supra n~) t t· 1:2. 
( ) _t C'I .. !U:t·sc·, the lsslH·r and bondholders cCJuld agree to n1odify th e cor:tr 1ct ;_ts to ;_n·oid the 
;~h<-_';r ~:n t i;- ·: tcrp r ct:.d:i~~, n . B1' t thi :-; is unlik t.'ly tc nccur. a:-; the p ar ty bc·ncfittcd hy th :.:' inU:'rpretat i (Jil 
,-, t r.) h::.--.·c· ·~· -. : ··:: ·: J:;nn;i~- irL·t·nti\·t: t (J surrer:cle r tlv~· gain. 
-
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classical inquiry might be cheaper for the parties to litigate . 1 I s It 
certainly would be easier on the judge . Classical analysis proceeds 
along familiar lawyerlike lines . The judge t akes a dictionary m eaning 
and checks to make sure it fits smoothly into the docum ent's regula-
tory scheme. Neoclassical analysis, by expanding the inquiry to in-
clude all r eal world expectations, requires courts to make judgm ents 
informed as much by business as by legal considerations. Such business 
judgments lie outside of \vhat many judges like to see as the ordinary 
sphere of their competence . These consider a tions of judicial conven-
ience and judicial competence are buttressed by the subs tantial self-
protective capabiliti es of the parties to these relationships. Large bor-
rowers and institutional lenders tend to have sufficient m eans to 
\.v ithstand minor impairments to their expectati ons and to protect 
themselves against the recurrence of such impairments. 
O f course this them e of self-protection t ends as a practical matte r 
to m ean self-protection for the lend er only. The cl osing of the loan 
satisfies most of the borrower's transactional goals. The lende r's ex pec-
tations depend much more on contract rights and judicial cnLnce-
ment m echanisms . By restrictin g the interpretation inquiry, the co urts 
increase the lender's burden by m a king it less likely that the system of 
contract provisions on \\'hi ch th e lender depends actua lh· \\· ill p r otect 
it. 11 8 Th e courts thereby also protect t he borrO\\ er"s interest in plan-
ning freed om by puttin g t he burden to inhibi t it on the lender. By thus 
burdening lenders and p rotecting borrowers. cuntr<lct ]a,,. does ;w 
more than pia:-; th e t heme of cred itor self-protect ion t hat clumirwtes 
most debtor-creditor la\\ . 
All three of these cunsidcrations--.judie:ial com enit:nCt ' , judiciul 
business incompetence and creditor :,df-pro tecti cm--are t·rrati ca ll~· 
a nd selectin;l~· ap p lied by the courts . \\ ' ith uthcr bw;incss relation -
ships . courts rou tine!~· gin· pr irnacy to t he stra in ut cont<:>mporar~ 
legal values \\· hich b ids them to go as far as the rcle\ ant e\·idence 
carries them in pursuit of the fa irest resu lt . Consider as an e:\ample 
the extensi\·e jurisprudence of fid uciar: clut i t· .~ of rnanagcrnent tu 
stockholders and of majorit\ to m inor ity stockholder:; . J uclic i<.t! deci-
sions respecting these corporate relati ons hips d isrcgarcl com cn ic·nc·e 
'" But it can be: noted th a t 1hL· l3mud r1pinion's qualiFied classicism . St'L' s11pra tc-:t acc:o n!p<Hi\·-
ing notes S6--DO . in\·ites liti.t.:;atin :.; part i e~; to try u1rt contc:-..:tl l:.-J.l ;.n _~ tl! I i!: nl .; in <.: ~!\t' th!_' court i~1i .~ht 
find then1 ··con1 pe!l ing ... Thii~i . sorne of thl' cosb nf r; encla:-:si cisnl ;.ue inUJt·rc(l in an ~· c\ ·(:nt. 
11 11 A differe nt situation arise:; 11po n thL' debtor's insuh·e:1cy. At this pninL t:h e !a\\. oF fraudu-
lent. conveya r; ces and . perh aps. fede ral bankruptcy Ia,\ · p ro tect th e· cred itc r. St·(· Bra tton. ;.;upnt 
note 12 . 
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and involve complex business judgments.120 The same point can be 
made regarding requirements contracts and exclusive dealing con-
tracts. The good faith questions generated by these relationships rou-
tinely entail both great judicial effort and difficult judicial business 
judgments. 121 In both areas, also, moral strictures against selfish be-
havior figure prominently among the judicial norms' constituent ele-
ments. And yet no systematic distinctions can be drawn between the 
self-protective capabilities of the parties to these relationships and 
corporate creditors. The cast of characters in all these situations in-
cludes large corporate entities and similarly sophisticated individuals. 
As the old doctrinal barriers to protecti\·e judicial intervention fall 
away· with respect to more and more business relationships, the con-
t inued presence of such barriers in corporate debtor-creditor relations 
becomes increasingly anomalous. 
The above discussion makes the significance of Sharon Steel's 
second phase all the more apparent. Sharon Steel shows th at corporate 
debt relationships may be subject to aggressive modes of interpreta-
tion popularly supposed to be applicabl e on ly to other contractual 
relationships. The particular mode utilized shO\'~/S rare judicial solici-
' ,. d · · ' ·1 · r · ' h 1 tt · h d · t " 1 tuete ut ere 1tor mterests oy s 111tmg L.e crar 1n.g , ur en ·o t11e ::,or-
, . ' ' \ . ' ~ . ' ., t h .. , . +. "1 1 ro\ve r. ;:, houw tt'l l S approacn ,)ecome \l.·wespreao , . e ~.rad Jll ona crec-
ltor dili ;.:.:ence ethic coulc1 lose its olace as the nrim arv considf':ra tinn 
. ' 1.. .L ~ 
t,!uiding jud icial parti cip :-ttion in corpm·ate debtor-creditor relation-
c_: ~)~:e. : ::_.:_ ' :; I ()~: 
- ~~-~;~- ~-t (: · :_ 7~in n . 1t -- ~-, - ~_-_) ! _ :1 d not h ::L\ ·c· !; c· t·n :_r- ·ru:!(i. j q eith e r f '\ "C' :·1t . 
(')n l\· ~1 ~: J ,~ - ~ rr c r_ :n t r~t c t cl_·i ct· ;_ tf_c· :~ ~ t <;irL.d~: '" c·nrrcct " clec:isiurL ::tr ~ d ~ U\ . 
:! J ; t ic~n, nD 1~·1 t:~' rt _ :r ett.: -~·i,: ·Hl ( jUC· _< ~· io n :J !' ! \ t :·:-: -.. \·hen the· contr;.lct is r. 
i_-: - : .~ · ];_.:· a r j ·ll·o -_· i\ l( ·Jn:< . ttndcr t l\i\ ::.Ui:: Ll >·::i s . ;J l\v a_, · .·~ adrnrt of n1n1·e t:na n 
" l" 
·· · , :.; > ,. ' 
' I ~ ....; ._·: . (-'; :·.·. 
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embodying the ,-alues irnplicit in mu ch of contcm pc ran contract L \\. 
pro\·id e judges \\-ith reasons for choosing bet\n:en tht• co m pet in g 
m eanings. Judicial goHcTnance of the relationship ,-i nd icat in g o ne or 
anoth er of such \ -alues is im·oh-ed in C\T ry case T hus. all interpreta-
tion im-olves judicial "in ten ention ... 
Prentilin ,g norms ca n strongly :; ugges t one m eaning in prdercnc ~c· 
to a nother. as in th e eas~- cases d iscu ssed abon~ _ , : :; But. as in the 
difficul t cases . the norms also can k<n e t he court \\ ith cuns icl er <:;b le 
discretion in choosing bet\\ een permissible altl'rnat in·s. Cons iclcrccl in 
this lighL judicial "i ntervention .. occurs'' hen the judge fo ll m \- <; norms 
p o inting a\\·ay from the text o f the contract pH•\ i-, ion ~lt iss ue . 
\-Vhat distinguishes debt contract rela ti onships from many o ther 
contractual relationships is the narro\\' scope of jud icial discretion 
permitted in the usual interpretati on case under pre\· ailing no rms . 
rrl . 1 h 1 l . . J . . 1e norms p rotect expectatiOns, ano t e oeo t com r: tct s e:c\au::.tJ\ 'C 
nature and clear drafting tend strongh- to indica te '-'-here e:.:pectat ions 
li e . The parties rem a in t he prim ary la'.\--gi\·ers . 
\\ it hin the narrcm a n:a of judici<d cliscn'ci!l ll p> · n:~ i ltl'd );\ dchl 
CtJrltracts. \\·e fin cl ca\es i n \\·l ·tich e\ pcctat inn ·) ~u~ d 1r.u: _ll.1!.l~t .. cn r: rli c ~ . 
an d ca·,;e.s in \\-hi ch arc p resen ted >ippo r t l lni:;li c h<-l '-- i::r :: n ; :, l!Jl'titJlt\:' c1 
by the debt contr:Jct. the particul a r p~~;-ti c i ;J<l''tt-.: .;r t 
; , . \;. t' l f, ) 
